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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three papers studying institutions that assess human
capital and performance.
The first two chapters study the Chinese Civil Service Examination in 19th
century Jiangnan. Chapter 1 investigates how much intergenerational mobility
did the exam system actually induce. Results show that although nominally
every male was allowed to participate, in any given generation, effective compe-
tition mostly took place among individuals with enough resources. Substantial
advantages were enjoyed by families with established tradition of education in-
vestment and exam success. Multigenerational analysis reveals a much higher
level of elite persistence than what could be captured in analyzing only two
adjacent generations.
In Chapter 2, I track a sample of provincial graduates’ further progress in
the national exams and their official career attainment about 20 years after
they passed the provincial exam, with a focus on the role played by family
background. I find that the competition in the national exam resembles a
meritocratic competition when family background is measured only by the fa-
ther’s status. However, when family background is measured by the highest
status achieved by immediate paternal ancestors going back three generations,
the family background remains significant in predicting national exam success,
after controlling for proxy measures of competence. On official career attain-
ment, I find that provincial graduates whose fathers held higher offices were
significantly more likely to obtain higher offices themselves. Fathers’ office
prominence were especially crucial for achieving positions beyond entry-level
appointments. These results thus cast serious doubt on the thesis that the
imperial civil service was meritocratic. Considering the historical and insti-
tutional background, I suggest that nepotism and use of office purchase were
likely to lie behind the importance of fathers’ office holding to provincial grad-
uates’ career paths.
Chapter 3 is a joint work with Matt Shum and Xi Wu. We examine strategic
behavior in “360-degree” performance appraisal systems, in which an employee
is evaluated by her supervisor, subordinate(s), peers (colleagues) and him-
self/herself. Using proprietary data from a mid-sized Chinese accounting firm,
vii
we find that employees manipulate their ratings to peers: they grant better
ratings to their less qualified peers while giving poorer ratings to their more
qualified peers, compared with evaluations from employees who are not peers.
In addition, this manipulation is mostly done by employees who themselves
are less qualified. Altogether, this implies that more-qualified employees “lose”
from the 360-degree evaluation scheme, and we show that their promotion
chances would be (slightly) higher under the traditional “top-down” scheme in
which their performance ratings is based only on the appraisal of their superi-
ors. We discuss implications for improving a 360-degree performance appraisal
system.
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Part I
Social Mobility and Meritocracy:
Lessons from Chinese Imperial
Civil Service Examination
1
2C h a p t e r 1
LADDER OF SUCCESS? MOBILITY IN CHINESE IMPERIAL
CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATION IN 19TH CENTURY
JIANGNAN
1.1 Introduction
The Chinese Imperial Civil Service Examination (“Imperial Examination” here-
after) is widely considered as an example of meritocracy. The imperial bureau-
cracy staged regular written examinations. Successful candidates received de-
grees that served as the basis for bureaucratic recruitment and the corner stone
of social hierarchy. The system had some features of a meritocracy: outcomes
were objectively evaluated but equality of opportunity was not provided. On
the one hand, the Imperial Examination was open access in the sense that
almost all male members in the society were allowed to participate and their
written answers were anonymously evaluated. On the other hand, education
and examination participation were mainly privately funded. Consequently,
sons of poor families faced challenges due to financial constraints, while sons
who grew up in well-educated and prosperous families might enjoy significant
advantages. The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically the level of
mobility in the examination system.
Scholars have quite different views about the degree of social mobility per-
mitted by the civil service examination system. Kracke (1947) and Ho (1962)
suggested that a substantial level of mobility was induced by the examination
system in the Song dynasty (960-1279) and the Ming-Qing period (1368-1911)
respectively. In his landmark study, Ho showed that under the Ming and Qing
there were no effective legal and social barriers to climbing the social ladder by
participating the civil service examinations. Ho estimated the composition of
family background for successful candidates at different hierarchical levels of
the examination system. For example, Ho found that, under the Qing, 37.2%
of national graduates (jinshi) had no immediate paternal ancestors going three
generations back who had held office or risen beyond the lowest degree. If we
restrict the data further and require these ancestors to have not held office or
3passed any examination, the proportion falls to 19.1%.1 Ho interpreted these
estimates as evidence that the civil service examinations introduced significant
new blood in to the officialdom.
Other scholars have challenged this optimistic view by emphasizing the lacking
of equality of opportunities in the system. Elman (1991) argued that the lin-
guistic challenge of the examination curriculum and fierce competition implied
that “those from families with limited traditions of literacy were unlikely to
compete successfully in the degree market with those whose family traditions
included classical literacy”(p.17). He further concluded that the examination
system facilitated and legitimated the social reproduction of the status quo
with its theoretical openness.
Just how much mobility did the system actually induce? To answer this ques-
tion, I collected a sample of successful candidates in the Jiangnan provincial
exam in the 19th century. By carefully studying their family histories of exam
success going back three generations, I document some important multigener-
ational mobility patterns in the exam system. I find that families with a better
established tradition of education investment and exam success enjoyed sub-
stantial and persistent advantages in examination success. Stratification took
place across different groups defined by father’s degree status. It also existed
within each group, where a small subgroup of individuals enjoyed substantially
higher chance of success than the group’s overall level.
These results suggest that although in theory everyone was allowed to partici-
pate, in fact, in any given generation, the competition seemed mostly involved
individuals from families with established tradition of educational investment
and exam preparation, who knew how to groom their sons to be to be competi-
tive exam candidates. The extremely high-stake payoffs and fierce competition
meant that any disadvantage caused by lacking of resources and guidance could
be fatal in the race for success. While upward mobility was still possible, it
1Under the Ming, these two percentages are 50% and 47.5%. The difference between
the two percentages is much smaller under the Ming. This is mostly because the different
natures of the shengyuan degree under the two dynasties. As explained by Ho (1959, p.345;
1962, p.175), in the first 150 years of the Ming, the lowest shengyuan degrees would be
deprived of their degrees if their holders failed to acquire higher degrees within a certain
period of time. In other words, in the Ming, ancestors of j inshi graduates who appear
to have no degrees could have had obtained and later been deprived of their shengyuan
degrees. Hence, it is more appropriate to use the less restrictive criterion to compare these
two dynasties (i.e., 50% in the Ming versus 37.2% in the Qing).
4often required more than one generation to rise from a humble origin. The
ladder of success becomes several generations long.
The current study contributes to the literature on social mobility in Late
Imperial and modern China (e.g., Shiue, 2016; Jiang, 2012; Jiang and Kung,
2015; Hao, 2013; Song, Campbell, and Lee, 2015; Song and Mare, 2015; Chen
et al., 2015).2 Shiue (2016) is particularly related to the current study. Shiue
constructed a dataset of about 10,000 individuals in five linked generations
using genealogies of 7 lineages in Tongcheng county, Anhui province. She
showed that persistence of social status cannot be captured only by father-son
intergenerational analysis.3 While the dataset collected by Shiue (2016) has
its unique value of covering a large number of general population, my dataset
complements hers in that my sample has much more comprehensive coverage of
successful candidates in the exam system especially for provincial and national
graduates. As shown in Table 1 of Shiue (2016), only 101 individuals in her
dataset obtained tribute student status (gongsheng), provincial or national
degrees. The current study also contributes to the literature on the social and
political functions of Chinese Imperial Examination (e.g., Bai and Jia, 2016;
Kung and Ma, 2014).4
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I provide a historical review
of the exam system and estimate the size of the population of each type of
degree holders and the magnitude of the exam participation. In Section 1.3, I
describe the data source. In Section 1.4, I estimate the chance of exam success
conditional on family background, which serves as the benchmark for studying
the sample of provincial graduates. In Section 1.5, I analyzed the family
histories of exam success for the sample of Jiangnan provincial graduates.
2Jiang and Kung (2015) will be discussed in Chapter 2.
3With the rich information in the dataset, Shiue also investigated the roles of the inter-
marriage and non-lineal relationship played in mobility. She found that greater inequality
was associated with lower level of mobility.
4Bai and Jia (2016) show that higher licentiate quotas per capita were associated with
higher probability of revolution participation after the abolition of the exam system in 1905,
suggesting the importance of the exam system in maintaining social stability. Kung and Ma
(2014) show the importance of Confucian cultural norm in mitigating social conflicts after
negative economic shocks.
51.2 Historical Review
1.2.1 Overview of Exam Structure under the Qing
Since its start in 607, the Imperial Examination system had evolved substan-
tially by the time of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Under the Qing, the system
consisted of a tri-level hierarchy of examinations. Each level corresponded to
a level in the administrative hierarchy where examinations were given: prefec-
tural, provincial, and national. At the prefectural level, licensing examinations
(tongshi) were held twice every three years.5 Candidates who passed the li-
censing examination were awarded the licentiate degree (shengyuan), which
was the student status at the dynastic local schools. In most cases, the dy-
nastic local schools did have the capability of effective education, and served
no more than testing centers and places for students to roster (Elman, 2000,
p.145; Schneewind, 2006, p.3). The licentiate degree did not qualify its holder
for public office, but it provided the qualification to participate in higher-level
civil service examinations as well as a variety of social, legal and economic
privileges. The provincial and the national level examinations were usually
held every three years, with extraordinary “special examination by imperial
grace”(enke) added to celebrate occasions such as major imperial birthdays or
when a new emperor acceded to the throne.6 While a provincial degree (ju-
ren, lit., “raised candidate”) qualified its holders for public office, passing the
national level which granted the highest national degree (jinshi, lit., “literatus
presented to the emperor for appointment”7), almost guaranteed for a decent
appointment (e.g., county magistrate) and paved the way to the most more
promising careers.8
5The licensing examination consisted of three stages: the county-level test (xianshi),
the prefectural test (fushi), and the qualifying exam (yuanshi). In the first two stages, the
county magistrate and the prefect at the student’s hometown served as examiners. In the
last stage, the provincial director of studies (xuezheng), who was directly appointed by and
responsible to the emperor, visited each prefecture in the province to organize its qualifying
exam.
6As Miyazaki(1981, p.39) insightfully commented, the name of these extraordinary ex-
aminations “reflected a change in the concept of the examinations: now they were regarded
as acts of imperial generosity, opening the path for scholars eager to become officials, whereas
originally they had been held by the emperor in order to recruit officials to assist him.”
7This translation is due to Elman (2000, p.8).
8Man-Cheong (2004) studied the cohort who passed the national level examinations at
1761. Out of the 217 national graduates, 173 (79.7%) of them received appointment equal
or higher than rank 7 (the rank of county magistrate).
61.2.2 Examination Quota System
For each level of examinations, quotas regulated how many candidates were
allowed to pass at each exam location. The quota system allowed the imperial
court to control the size and regional distribution of degree holders, and guar-
antee representation for the less developed regions in the civil service. At the
prefectural level, a quota was set for each county for the students who stud-
ied there; there was also a separate prefecture school quota for those students
who studied there.9 Candidates in different prefectures, thus, did not compete
with each other for the licentiate degree. The average licentiate quota for a
county was about 17 per exam before the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and
20 afterward, which corresponds to 11 and 13.4 per year respectively.10
For provincial examinations, quotas were set for each province. So candidates
from the same province competed with each other independently of their pre-
fecture origin. In national examinations, a series of policy changes brought
about more and more refined regional division of the total admission quota.
There were no regional quotas at the beginning of Ming dynasty. However, the
predominance of southerners in the 1397 examination led to fierce complaints
from northerners, which eventually led to execution of the chief examiner as
ordered by the emperor even though no evidence of scandal was found (Ho,
1962, p.187). From then on, the total admission quota was divided into re-
gional quotas for major regions (i.e., northern, central, and southern). In 1702,
a new policy change was made to further improve the representation of the
less developed provinces, which set provincial quotas before each examination
by taking into account the number of participants from each province.
9This was due to the fact that every county had a dynastic county school, and at every
prefecture seat there was a separate dynastic prefecture school. Each school had its own
school quota. Candidates who passed the licensing exam could either enroll the county
school at his hometown or the prefecture school at the prefecture seat. The practice of how
to split the prefecture quota into counties could be by merit (ping wen, i.e., by performance
at each exam) or by some fixed proportions according to the custom. As shown in cases
from the Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty, the practice varied from place to place and
time to time; sometimes conflicts among counties did arise due to disputes about how to
split the prefecture school quota (Liu, 2009).
10According to the estimates of Chang (1955), the nationwide total licentiate quota was
25,089 per exam before the Taiping Rebellion and 30,597 afterward. There were 1514
county-level administrative units (i.e., county, department, and subprefecture) in Jiaqing
reign (1796-1820) and the number increased slightly to 1523 in Guangxu reign (1875-1908)
Ch’u (1962).
71.2.3 Size of Each Type of Degree Holders
To better understand the hierarchy, it is helpful to figure out the number of
degree holders and their percentage in the population at each level in the exam
hierarchy. We start from the two prefectural level degrees, the hard-earned
licentiate degree, and the purchased student status at the Imperial Academy
(jiansheng, “the purchased degree” hereafter). In his classic study of Chinese
scholar-official elites, Chang (1955) estimated the size of (living) degree holders
from the frequency of exams, the exam quota, the average age of passing, and
the life expectancy of degree holders. According to Chang’s estimates, on
average a licentiate obtained his degree at the age of 24, and died at the age
of 57. In a licentiate’s 33 years of holding the degree, a total of 22 licensing
exams were held, given an exam frequency of twice every three years. Thus, the
number of (living) licentiates is 21 times the exam quota. This leads to Chang’s
estimates of 526,869 licentiates before the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and
642,537 afterward, which corresponds to about 0.42% and 0.54% of the adult
male population in 1820 and 1880 respectively, using population estimates by
Cao (2000).11 To bring some intuition for these numbers, I compare them with
educational attainment in current China. According to the 2010 Census, the
proportion of the adult population with a bachelor’s degree was 4.3%, and the
proportion with a graduate degree was 0.39%.12
In addition, Chang estimated the number of (living) purchased degree hold-
ers to be 355,535 before the Taiping Rebellion and 533,303 afterward, which
corresponded to 0.28% and 0.44% of the adult male population respectively.
The increase in the post-Taiping period was partially due to the discounted
price for the degree and more convenient purchasing procedures, which were
adopted to promote sales as the court’s fiscal pressure intensified.13 It is worth
11According to the estimates synthesized by Rawski (1979, p.183-184), males representing
52.3% of the population, and 37% of the males were under age 16. Thus, male population
(above 16) represented 32.9% of the total population. Cao (2000) estimated that the total
population in China was 383.1 million in 1820 and 364.4 million in 1880.
12As the consequence of the sharp expansion in China’s higher education sector since
1999, enrollment in colleges and graduate school increased in younger age cohorts. For
example, the proportion that had a bachelor’s degree was 13.1% in the age cohort of 22-year
olds (born in 1988), and the proportion with graduate degree was 1.21% in the age cohort
of 27-year olds (born in 1983).
13The estimates for the pre-Taiping period were relatively accurate, and were based on the
systematic compilation of Board of Revenue archives by Tang (1931). The estimates for the
post-Taiping period were more speculative in nature. After examining idiosyncratic evidence
about degree sales in the post-Taiping period, Chang made the conservative assumption of a
50% increase from the pre-Taiping period. It worth noting that the Jiangnan region probably
8noting that the size of these two types of prefectural level degree holders were
of the same order of magnitude.
The number of candidates passing each provincial exam was roughly 1300
in the pre-Taiping period and 1500 afterward, that is, 638 and 667 provin-
cial graduates per year respectively.14 Following Chang’s estimation methods
(p.125-126), there should have been about 17,000 and 18,000 (living) provin-
cial graduates before and after the Taiping Rebellion. So in every 1 million
male adults, there were only about 135 to 150 provincial graduates. About
18% of provincial graduates could further succeed in the national level ex-
ams, to obtain the highest degree.15 To draw some comparison to educational
achievement in current China, in 2013, the chance for an 18 years old to enroll
into the top two Chinese universities, Peking and Tsinghua (each admitted
about 3400 freshmen), was about 377 in 1 million, which was about twice the
proportion of provincial graduates in the adult male population.16 Clearly
then, the provincial examinations produced a microscopic elite, and even the
prefectural exams were extremely restrictive.
1.2.4 Magnitude of Participation and Competition
Degree holders constituted only a tiny proportion of the whole population
(prefectural degrees obtained by merit were held by fewer than 0.5% of adult
males).17 However, the exam system affected both those who succeeded and
those who tried but failed. The number of people who ever participated in the
licensing exams (tongsheng), was roughly equal to the number of classically
educated males, since virtually every boy who studied the classical curriculum
experienced a much faster increase in its number of purchased degree holders, according to
the evidence discussed by Chang (1955, p.109-110). In my later analysis, I will assume a
70% increase for the Jiangnan region, which should still be a conservative estimate.
14The provincial exam quota was increased several times in the post-Taiping period. El-
man (2000, p.682) provided a tabulation of eight provincial exams in the Qing. Additionally,
from the lists that I collected, 1585 candidates passed the 1876 provincial exam, and 1540
passed the 1897. Chu (2015) provided extensive discussion on this issue. The actual fre-
quency of provincial and national exams in the nineteenth century was about one in every
2.04 years in the pre-Taiping period, and 2.25 years afterward.
15Chang (1955) summarizes the number of jinshi in each national exam. There were
about 108 and 124 national graduates per year before and after the Taiping Rebellion.
16 The size of the age cohort of 18-year olds in 2013 (born 1995) was 18 million, inferred
from the 2010 Census.
17The was a parallel but less prestigious military exams are not discussed in this paper.
As Chang (1955, Table 20 and 22) calculated, there were 212,330 military licentiates in
pre-Taiping period, and 268,060 in the post-Taiping, which correspond to 0.17% and 0.22%
of male population respectively.
9aimed to pass the licensing exam (Johnson, 1985, p.59). Estimates about
this crucial number can only be constructed from idiosyncratic discussions in
sources such as local gazetteers and imperial edicts.18 Before proceeding, we
need to distinguish two quantities: the number of participants in one licensing
exam, and the total number of (living) people who ever participated. While the
latter is of our primary interest, the former was the quantity usually discussed
in the sources. The difference depended on the average number of exams in
which each classically educated student participated in his lifetime. Assuming
a life expectancy of 57 and the age of the first participation to be 16, there
were a total of 28 licensing exams held in between. Given that the average
age of passing was about 24 and very few passed it after 30 years old, the
active period of participation was confined to the 10 licensing exams from
age 16 to 30 (Chang, 1955, p.95; Johnson, 1985, p.59). So the total number
of classically educated males was about three to four times as great as the
number of participants in one exam.19 The following formula summarizes the
estimation method. The number of participants in one exam is equal to the
licentiate quota in one exam divided by the admission rate in one exam.
Nclassically educated =
licentiate quota in one exam
admission rate in one exam
×multiplier adjusting repeated participation
Chang (1955, p.90-92) estimated that the number of participants in one li-
censing exam was “a little over 1,000 and certainly not over 1,500” in a county
and claimed that the admission rate was generally about 1% to 2% (p.11).20
Later studies (Liang, 2006; Wang, 2014) as well as my own investigation,
which extensively searched over the Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty
(Qing Shilu), generally supported Chang’s estimates for the pre-Taiping pe-
riod. However, it is important to emphasize the decline of participation in the
post-Taiping period, especially in regions like Jiangnan, whose economy had
18When local officials or local elites applied to the emperor for adjustments in the licensing
exam quota, the number of participants in each exam (yingshi tongsheng) was a crucial figure
to be reported and checked. The court tended to not approve any adjustment, unless solid
evidence of extremely unreasonable quota was presented.
19An assumption that on average a student participated in seven licensing exams corre-
sponds to the four-times multiplier. This seems to be reasonable, since usually a student
did not participate in licensing exams consecutively and exam participation was prohibited
during the three-year mourning period for one’s parents. This was supported by reviewing
some biographical chronicles of degree holders.
20Although Chang did not provide further justification for his claims about the admission
rate, his estimate of the number of participants and his claim about the admission rate were
consistent, given that the admission quota for a county was about 16.6 per exam before the
Taiping Rebellion and 20.1 afterward.
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been severely disrupted by the war. For example, the number of participants
in one licensing exam in the Yixing and Jiaxing county in Jiangnan fell from
2,500 in 1726 to only about 600 in the post-Taiping period, which corresponded
to an increase in admission rate in one licensing exam from 1% to 4.5% (Liang,
2006, p.51).21 In 1895, the Jiangnan provincial director of studies reported to
the emperor that, “After the war, many places declined and have not yet re-
covered. Now, even in counties with the highest participation [in the southern
Jiangnan], the number of candidates is less than 1,000.” This implies that the
admission rate in one licensing exam should be higher than 3%, since the li-
centiate quota for a large county in Jiangnan then was about 30. However,
it is possible that when participation declined, the average number of exams
that a participant attended in his lifetime also decreased. For my estimation,
I assume that in the pre-Taiping period, the admission rate in each exam was
1.25% in Jiangnan and 2% nationwide, and each student participated seven
exams (a multiplier of four), and in the post-Taiping period, the admission rate
in each exam was 3% and each student participated in 6.2 exams (a multiplier
of 4.5). These assumptions reflect the declined participation and increased
quotas in the post-Taiping period, which made passing the prefectural exams
easier than before. Table 1.1 presents the estimates. The classically educated
males numbered about 5 million in the pre-Taiping period, and 4.6 million
after the war, which corresponded to 4% and 3.8% of the adult male popula-
tion respectively. The estimated cumulative pass rate for licensing exams, the
ratio of the number of licentiates to classically educated males, increased from
10.5% to 14% after the Taiping Rebellion. This was driven by a 22% increase
in licentiate quota and an 8.5% decrease in the size of the classically educated
male population.
21Licentiate quota in each exam for these two counties was 25 before Taiping and 27 after
it.
11
Table 1.1: Estimates of Number of Degree Holders and Classically Educated Male Population
Region-Period Population(in 1,000)
Adult
Males (in
1,000)
Licentiate
Quota
per exam
Classically
Educated Licentiate
Purchased
Jiansheng
Provincial
Graduates
Licentiates
/Classically
Educated
N. % N. % N. % N.
per
million
Jiangnan
(pre-Taiping) 71,503 23,560 2,691 861,120 3.7% 56,511 0.24% 50,153 0.21% 1750 74 6.6%
Jiangnan
(post-Taiping) 50,883 16,765 3,440 516,000 3.1% 72,240 0.43% 85,260 0.51% 1900 113 14%
Nationwide
(pre-Taiping) 383,100 126,228 25,089 5,017,800 4.0% 526,869 0.42% 355,535 0.28% 17,000 135 10.5%
Nationwide
(post-Taiping) 364380 120,060 30,597 4,589,550 3.8% 642,537 0.54% 533,303 0.44% 18,000 150 14%
Notes: The percentages are with respect to the adult male population.
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It is worth noting that the proportion of classically educated males in 19th
century Qing China was about the same magnitude as the proportion of adult
population holding bachelor’s degree in China today.
1.3 Data Description
Two main types of archival materials record the outcomes of provincial exams.
Official rosters (Ti Ming Lu) were compiled and sent to the emperor after
each provincial exam. They compiled the exam questions, selected exam es-
says, the complete list of successful candidates and their exam ranking, place of
origin, age, and prefectural level degree status.22 The other type of materials,
provincial exam alumni directories (Tongnian Lu or Tongnian Chilu), pro-
vide more detailed personal information such as provincial graduates’ family
background and their political career advancement after the provincial exam.
Specifically, the alumni directories record degree and office holding status of
provincial graduates’ immediate paternal ancestors going three generations
back. In some directories, degree and office holding status of their brothers,
uncles, and sons are also included. The compilation of alumni directories was
voluntarily organized by provincial graduates who passed at the same year.
It was related to the cultural phenomenon that examiners were considered
as teachers by all exam candidates, and candidates who passed at the same
year considered each other classmates. Alumni cherished these relationships
for their shared memories and for the value of networking. After their ini-
tial compilation, alumni directories were periodically updated to record their
advancement in national exams and in political careers.23
Based on these two types of materials, I constructed an individual-level dataset
of successful candidates in Jiangnan provincial exams in the 19th century. I
started by building a larger sample with basic personal information using of-
ficial rosters, and then utilized the alumni directories to add more detailed
information about candidates’ family background for a subset of exams whose
alumni directories are available. In the 19th century, there were 42 provin-
cial exams held in Jiangnan.24 I found official rosters for 34 of them. In
22Ages of provincial graduates were not recorded until 1804.
23For more detailed discussion of these archival materials, see Liu (2003) and Ma (2013).
24Four Jiangnan provincial exams (1855, 1858, 1861, and 1862) were interrupted by
the Taiping Rebellion, when the Taiping occupied Nanjing, the provincial exam center for
Jiangnan. These 4 exams are not counted in the total of 42 exams that were actually held.
Quotas in these interrupted exams were added into later exams (1859, 1864, 1867, and 1870).
In 1859, the Jiangnan provincial exam was held in the neighboring Zhejiang province.
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addition, using alumni directories, I recovered the complete lists of successful
candidates for five exams whose official rosters were not available. Altogether,
I constructed a sample containing all 5,623 individuals who passed Jiangnan
provincial exams in these 39 exams (about 144 per exam). It covers more than
90% of provincial graduates who passed the exam in Jiangnan in this period,
and for the 39 exams that it covers, it includes every successful candidate.
Then, I used alumni directories to add family background information. Out
of the 39 Jiangnan provincial exams, I found alumni directories for 14. This
gives me a smaller sample of 1834 provincial graduates, which is about a
third of the larger sample. It constitutes about 88% of the total number of
provincial graduates in these 14 exams. The missing observations are mainly
in two exams (1859 and 1864), where missing observations comprise about one
third of the toal. In the rest of the sample, about 94% of the total number
of provincial graduates are included. This dataset will be employed in the
analysis of mobility.
1.4 Estimating the Chance of Exam Success in the General Popu-
lation
1.4.1 Method of Estimation
To estimate a person’s chance of passing a certain exam conditional on his
father’s degree status, I apply Bayes’ rule:
P (ds = i|df = j) = P (df = j|ds = i)P (ds = i)
P (df = j)
.
A candidate is characterized by (df , ds), where ds denotes his degree status,
and df the degree status of his father. P (df = j|ds = i) is the conditional
probability that a successful candidate in the exam associated with the i-
th degree had a father holding the j-th degree. It can be estimated from
the degree status composition of successful candidates’ fathers in the exam
associated with the i-th degree.
I make the simplifying assumption that the population density of each type
of degree holders in the sons’ generation remained the same as in the fathers’
generation. This is reasonable given the stability of exam quotas and moderate
population growth in one generation. According to Cao (2000), during the
period from 1776 to 1820, the average annual population growth rate was
0.45% in Jiangsu and 0.49% in Anhui, and growth slowed afterward. The
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growth rate in this period corresponds to a population growth of about 12%
over 25 years, which we can neglect at least initially. Under the constant
population assumption, P (ds) remains the same across generations, and it
can be estimated by the density of each type of degree holders in the male
population. In addition, this assumption implies that P (df = j) = njP (ds =
j), where nj is the average number of sons that a j-th degree holder had.
Therefore, we have
P (ds = i|df = j) = 1
njP (ds = j)
P (df = j|ds = i)P (ds = i).
Intuitively, a person’s chance is proportional to the representation of his family
background in the pool of successful candidates, and inversely proportional to
the size of his family background group. Based on micro-level data collected
from genealogies, scholars estimated the average number of sons that a mar-
ried man had in late Imperial Jiangnan, ranging from 1.5 to 2.3 (Liu, 1992;
Hou, 1998; Peng and Hou, 1996).25 Although the lineages they studied varied
significantly in their level exam success, it is necessary to keep in mind that
most of them consisted of relatively well-to-do families. After all, the popula-
tion growth rates discussed above imply that these numbers were well above
the average level in the population.26 And it is well known that individuals
with higher socioeconomic status had reproductive advantages in traditional
Chinese society (Lavely and Wong, 1992).
1.4.2 Validity Check of the Estimation Method
In order to check the validity of this method, I compare the estimated prob-
ability that a provincial graduate’s son could pass the provincial exam with
the actual degree status distribution of provincial graduates’ sons, using the
1870 Jiangnan provincial exam alumni directory (1906 edition). This alumni
directory was published 36 years after the provincial exam, with the longest
25Hou (1998) studied two lineages in Jiangsu province. Hou found that a married male
in a certain Cao lineage of Shanghai, which had a well established tradition of exam success
and office holding, had 1.64 sons on average. And married male in a certain Fan lineage
of Jiangyin, which was at most well-to-do and rarely had degree holders, had 1.53 sons
on average. Liu (1992) collected information about 42,785 elementary families from 50
genealogies across China and estimated that a married man had an average of 2.29 sons
(p.100). Liu also noted that Jiangsu had the lowest level among the 12 provinces she
studied (p.94).
26If a man in the society had an average of 1.5 sons, then the male population would
grow 50% in one generation.
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gap in the 14 alumni directories that I collected. Many provincial graduates
had information about their grandsons recorded in this directory. It seems
reasonable to expect that the recorded degree statuses of the sons were close
to their final outcomes. Only 5 out of the total 305 provincial graduates had
missing information in their records, and these were dropped from analysis.
The 300 provincial graduates had 668 sons (an average of 2.23 sons per per-
son), among whom 27 held provincial or national degrees (4.0%)27, 177 held
only prefectural level degrees (26.5%), 88 held purchased degrees (13.2%), and
376 held no degrees (56.3%).
Then, I apply the above estimation method to the data. In the class of 1870,
10% provincial graduates had fathers who also passed the provincial exam (i.e.,
P (df = P&N |ds = P&N) = 10%).28 Each had an average of 2.23 sons (i.e.,
nj = 2.23). Plugging these into the formula, it gives that P (ds = P&N |df =
P&N) = 0.1
2.23
= 4.5%, which is not far from the 4.0% directly computed from
the directory.
1.4.3 Probabilities of Passing the Provincial Examination
I apply the above method to estimate the probability that an individual could
pass the provincial exam conditional on his father’s degree status. In my sam-
ple of successful candidates in 14 Jiangnan provincial exams, the percentages
of provincial graduates who had fathers who held provincial and national de-
grees, prefectural degrees, purchased degrees and no degrees were 10%, 33%,
27% and 30% respectively. This composition was relatively stable over time.
In particular, the pre-Taiping and post-Taiping subsample had very similar
percentages. I assume that a provincial graduate had 2 sons, a male who
held other degrees had 1.75 sons, a classically educated male without degree
had 1.5 sons, and an average male who held no degrees had 1 son. Although
the difference in the average number of sons between different types of degree
holders could be smaller, I make this assumption to bias against increasing the
difference in estimated probabilities. Table 1.2 presents the estimated results.
The chances of provincial graduates’ sons were more than eight times larger
than those whose fathers held prefectural level degrees, who in turn were about
eight times more likely to pass the provincial exam than those whose fathers
were classically educated but held no degrees.
27Specifically, there were 4 national graduates and 23 provincial graduates.
28P&N denotes to the provincial or national degrees.
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Table 1.2: Estimated Probability of Passing the Provincial Examination
Conditional on Father’s Degree Status
Father’s Degree Status Son’s Probability
Provincial/National 5.0%
Prefectural 0.60%
Purchased 0.54%
None
(if the son was classically educated)
0.06%
None 0.002%
1.4.4 Probabilities of Passing the Prefectural Examinations
Systematic records about successful candidates in prefectural exams are very
rare. In the sample of successful candidates in prefectural exams in Chang-
shu county, Jiangsu, about 35% had fathers who also passed the prefectural
exams.29 Details this estimate and the data source are provided in Appendix
A. However, the source did not further distinguish fathers who purchased
degrees from those who held no degrees at all. I assume that fathers who
passed the prefectural exam had 1.75 sons, classically educated fathers who
purchased degrees or held no degrees had 1.5 sons, and those who did not pass
the prefectural exam on average had 1 son. Table 1.3 presents the estimated
probabilities.
Table 1.3: Estimated Probability of Passing the Prefectural Examination
Conditional on Father’s Degree Status
Father’s Degree Status Son’s Probability
Prefectural or above 19.8%
Purchased degree or no degree
(if the son was classically educated)
3.7%
Purchased degree or no degree 0.2%
29Yuyang Keming Lu (Records of successful candidates in the Imperial Examinations in
Changshu and Zhaowen county).
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1.5 Analysis of the Sample of Provincial Graduates’ Paternal An-
cestors
1.5.1 Composition of Fathers’ Degree Status
The composition of fathers’ background was relatively stable over time. On
average, 10% of the fathers had passed the provincial or national examinations
and held the associated degrees. 33% had passed the prefectural exam and
held the prefectural degree, 27% purchased their prefectural degrees, and the
last 30% held no degrees. Table 1.4 and Figure 1.1 presents the trend of this
composition over time.
Table 1.4: Composition of Fathers’ Degree Status over Time
Exam Year Father’s Degree Status (% of Non-missing obs.) % Missing Total N.
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None
1810 7% 33% 26% 34% 4% 114
1816 11% 25% 21% 43% 8% 117
1821 8% 35% 26% 32% 10% 147
1828 9% 27% 32% 31% 8% 117
1832 15% 39% 21% 24% 5% 117
1834 9% 40% 28% 22% 12% 117
1835 12% 32% 26% 30% 2% 117
1840 15% 35% 19% 32% 6% 117
1843 13% 32% 30% 25% 8% 117
1844 10% 30% 30% 30% 8% 114
1849 6% 35% 35% 25% 4% 114
1859 9% 27% 34% 30% 38% 202
1864 8% 36% 19% 36% 32% 273
1870 10% 32% 28% 30% 0% 305
Total 10% 33% 27% 30% 12% 2088
The proportion of fathers of different degree status who held public office is
highlighted in Figure 1.2. On average, 88% of the fathers with provincial or
national degrees held offices. For fathers with prefectural degrees and fathers
with purchased degrees, the percentages were 22% and 25% respectively. Only
about 12% of fathers without degrees held offices, which were lowly positions
that did not require degrees.
I also classified the sample of provincial graduates into different categories
according to the highest degree obtained by their paternal ancestors going
back three generations. Doing so massively reduces the fraction of individuals
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Figure 1.1: Composition of Fathers’ Degree Status over Time
Figure 1.2: Composition of Fathers’ Degree and Office Holding over Time
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who were not from elite backgrounds. Indeed, 14% had paternal ancestors
within at least a provincial or national degree, 40% came from families with
a prefectural degree, and 29% descended from someone who had purchased
a degree. Only 14% of provincial graduates had no paternal ancestors going
back three generations with any degree. That is, among the 30% of provincial
graduates whose fathers held no degrees, less than half of them were “new
blood”.30
It is worth noting that for all degree categories, the office holding percentages in
this sample are significantly higher than their counterparts in the population.
This is simply because the sample comes from lists of provincial graduates. It
includes no fathers whose sons did not pass these exams. The fact that these
fathers all had a provincial graduate son means they formed a very selective
sample in terms of sons’ academic achievement. As estimates in Table 1.2
show, a son of a prefectural degree holder had only a 0.60% chance of passing
it, and the chance for for a son of a classically educated non-degree holder
was 0.06%. Moreover, the data have the additional feature that the lower the
father’s degree status, the higher the level of selectivity. For example, in the
population, the percentage of non-degree holding fathers who had a provincial
graduate son was much lower than that of provincial graduate fathers. The
higher office holding percentages in this sample were likely associated with its
selectivity. On one hand, some unobserved variables such as family wealth
could both contribute to the fathers’ office holding and at the same time im-
prove the sons’ exam performance. On the other hand, a father’s office holding
itself could bring advantages for his sons through increasing family resources.
1.5.2 Intergenerational Mobility: Father-Son Transition Matrix of
Degree Status
Because the data go back three generations, one can gain more detail about the
intergenerational transmission of success by analyzing the Great Grandfather
(GGF) to Grandfather transition, and the Grandfather to Father transition.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the data structure. The estimated transition matrices
(or mobility tables) are presented in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6.
30It is important to notice that the criteria of “new blood” that I adopt here (i.e., no
degree holding paternal ancestors going back three generations) is actually not the strictest
one. It does not consider maternal ancestors and kinship relationship in the lineage or clan.
Among this 14% of provincial graduates classified as “new blood”, there could be individuals
who had degree holding uncles or grandfather on the mother’s side.
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Figure 1.3: Illustration of the Data Structure
Table 1.5: Great Grandfather to Grandfather Transition Matrix of Degree
Status
GGF’s Degree Status Grandfather’s Degree Status N. %
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None
Provincial/National 30% 51% 16% 3% 76 4%
Prefectural 10% 43% 28% 19% 395 22%
Purchased 5% 25% 46% 24% 616 34%
None 2% 12% 23% 63% 733 40%
Column N. 112 449 577 682 1820 100%
Column % 6% 25% 32% 37%
There are two ways one could compare these matrices, the first being whether
the status of the prior generation matters for the status of the next generation,
the second being whether there is upward or downward social mobility across
the generations from GGF to Father.
Within each of the two transitions matrices, the younger generation’s degree
distribution was strictly monotonic to the older generation’s degree status, in
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Table 1.6: Grandfather to Father Transition Matrix of Degree Status
GGF’s Degree Status Grandfather’s Degree Status N. %
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None
Provincial/National 32% 41% 20% 7% 112 6%
Prefectural 16% 49% 20% 16% 449 25%
Purchased 8% 32% 40% 20% 577 32%
None 5% 21% 21% 53% 682 37%
Column N. 183 593 486 558 1820 100%
Column % 10% 33% 27% 31%
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Individuals whose fathers held
higher degrees were more likely to obtain higher degrees themselves. Figure
1.4 presents the two transitions. The x-axis is the younger generation’s degree
status ordered from the highest (provincial or national degree) to the lowest
(no degree). The y-axis is the cumulative percentages of the younger genera-
tion’s degree status. Different curves correspond to the group defined by their
fathers’ degree status. Although this is visible in Figure 1.4, we also perform a
log-likelihood ratio chi-square test (i.e. the “G-test”) that the null hypothesis
that fathers’ and sons’ degree status were independent. The test rejects the
null at p < .00001 for both tables. In addition to the monotonicity result,
comparisons can be made about the two groups, sons of prefectural degree
holders and sons whose fathers purchased degrees. Although these two groups
had very close percentages of holding at least some degree, the sons whose fa-
thers purchased degrees were more likely to purchase degrees themselves and
were less likely to earn them by passing examinations.
Second, there was a trajectory of upward mobility over these three genera-
tions. Table 1.7 and Figure 1.5 presents the degree status distribution of each
generation. Both the Grandfathers’ and the Fathers’ generations achieved
better degree status than their previous generations. This monotonicity can
be clearly seen in Figure 1.5. In addition, the improvement in the fathers’
generation was significantly higher than that in the grandfathers’ generation.
To facilitate further analysis, I define the “Markovian benchmark” for the Fa-
ther generation as the counterfactual scenario where the distribution of degree
status for the Father generation only depends on the previous generation’s de-
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Figure 1.4: Father-Son Transition Matrices of Degree Status
Figure 1.5: Cumulative Distribution of Degree Status in Three Generations
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Table 1.7: Composition of Degree Status over Generations
Degree Type
Generation
GGF Grandfather Father Father
(counterfactual)
Provincial/National 4% 6% 10% 7%
Prefectural 22% 25% 33% 26%
Purchased 34% 32% 27% 31%
None 40% 37% 31% 36%
gree status, and additionally, the Grandfather-Father transition matrix is the
same as that in the previous GGF-Grandfather transition. This corresponds
to a situation where the influence of all past generations on an individual’s
outcome is fully summarized by the father’s status (in a regression context,
the grandfather and great grandfather status has no explanatory power once
we include the father’s status). Second, I assume the intergenerational tran-
sition matrix is stable over time (the two panels of Figure 1.4 are identical).
With a Markovian benchmark, the changes in the Father generation’s degree
composition thus can be decomposed into two parts: one part is “the continua-
tion of past momentum” as in the Markovian benchmark, and the second part
is due to changes in the younger generation’s transition matrix. The purple
dotted line is the counterfactual cumulative distribution corresponding to the
Markovian benchmark, computed by applying the conditional probabilities in
the GGF-Grandfather transition matrix to the Grandfather’s marginal distri-
bution. Clearly, the upward mobility in the fathers’ generation was mostly
due to improvement in their transition matrix.
So far we have observed that families in the sample as a whole experienced up-
ward mobility across GGF, Grandfather, and Father generations. And as the
counterfactual analysis shows, the upward mobility from Grandfather to Fa-
ther generation was substantially larger than what the Markovian benchmark
would predict. To further examine the underlying structure of this observed
upward mobility, I divide families in the sample into four groups according the
GGF generation’s degree status, and then track degree status distribution in
the following two generations (i.e., Grandfather and Father) for each group.31
31Thus, families in each group had the same degree status in the beginning (i.e., GGF) and
the end (i.e., provincial graduates appeared in the alumni directories) of the four consecutive
generations.
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Table 1.8 presents these results. Figure 1.6 illustrates how these groups differed
in their trajectories. In each subplot, the orange curve is the Grandfathers’
cumulative distribution of degree status, and the green curve represents that
of the Fathers’. Again, the Markovian benchmark of the Father generation’s
degree distribution, computed by applying the GGF-Grandfather transition
matrix (Table 1.7) to the group’s Grandfather generation degree status dis-
tribution, is highlighted by the dotted line in each subplot. As a first result
to be noted, in the group whose GGF generation held provincial or national
degrees, their members in the Grandfather and Father generations achieved a
very impressive level of exam success— in both generations, about 30% passed
the provincial exams, and there were only 7% and 3% who held no degrees in
Grandfather and Father generations respectively.
The comparison between Grandfather and Father generations shows improved
chance of success in the Father generation in all but the group whose GGF
generation held provincial for national degrees, which experienced a slight
decline. The improvement was especially large in the group whose GGF gen-
eration held no degrees. While the slight decline in the group whose GGF
generation held provincial or national degrees does not seem to be impressive,
it actually indicates a substantial level of persistence of success compared with
the Markovian benchmark. In fact, the reason that families in the sample as a
whole achieved a level of upward mobility outperforming the Markovian bench-
mark, was mainly attributed to the persistence in the three groups whose GGF
generation held degrees. Although the group whose GGF generation held no
degrees improved significantly from Grandfather to Father generation, it did
not significantly beat the Markovian benchmark.
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Table 1.8: Composition of Degree Status in the Grandfather and Father
Generation by GGF’s Degree Status
GGF’s degree Generation
Degree Status
N.
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None
Prov./Nat.
Grandfather 30% 51% 16% 3%
76Father 29% 46% 18% 7%
Father (counterfactual) 15% 42% 27% 16%
Prefectural
Grandfather 10% 43% 28% 19%
395Father 14% 43% 23% 20%
Father (counterfactual) 9% 33% 31% 27%
Purchased
Grandfather 5% 25% 46% 24%
616Father 11% 34% 32% 23%
Father (counterfactual) 7% 28% 35% 31%
None
Grandfather 2% 12% 23% 63%
733Father 5% 24% 25% 46%
Father (counterfactual) 5% 20% 29% 47%
Figure 1.6: Cumulative Distribution of Degree Status in Grandfather and
Father Generations Conditional on Great Grandfather’s Degree Status
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It is important to reminder that the GGF-Grandfather transition matrix, the
basis for calculating the Markovian benchmark, itself reflects a level of success
beyond the reach of the overall population. In the GGF-Grandfather transi-
tion matrix, even among those whose fathers held no degrees, 2% passed the
provincial exam, an additional 12% passed the prefectural level exams, and
fewer than 40% failed to obtain any degree; while in the overall population
less than 0.5% of the adult male passed the prefectural level exams, and about
100 out of a million could obtain the provincial degree.
To formally test whether provincial graduates’ grandfathers had higher chances
of obtaining higher degree status than their fathers, I conduct further analy-
sis using ordered logistic regression. For the family history of each provincial
graduate, I split it into two observations, the GGF-Grandfather transition
and Grandfather-Father transition. In the ordered logistic regression, the de-
pendent variable is the younger generations’ degree status in each transition.32
The independent variable of primary interest is the dummy variable specifying
the generation: GF-F dummy takes value 1 for Grandfather-Father transition,
and it takes value 0 for GGF-Grandfather transition. Degree status of the older
generation in each transition is controlled. Table 1.9 presents the results. In
Column (1), GF-F dummy is significantly positive. This suggests that condi-
tional on the older generation’s degree status, the younger generation is more
likely to obtain higher degree status in Grandfather-Father transition than in
GGF-Grandfather transition. In Column (2), I use interaction terms between
the older generation’s degree status and the GF-F dummy. This helps to com-
pare difference between the two transitions in which the older generation had
the same degree status. Results of Column (2) show that the increase in the
chance of getting higher degree status is the largest when the older genera-
tion held no degree. Increases are also found when the older generation held
the purchased degree or prefectural degree. When the older generation held
provincial or national degree, there is no significant increase– the coefficient
is negative but not statistically significant. These results are consistent with
results in Table 1.8 and 1.6.
Lastly, I conduct some robustness check to show that the upward mobility
in provincial graduates’ family history was not driven by time trend. Specifi-
cally, I construct a subsample of transitions in the provincial graduates’ family
32The use of ordered logit is suitable for this analysis, as degree status can be ordered from
the lowest to the highest: “None ”, “Purchased ”, “Prefectural ”, and “Provincial/National ”.
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Table 1.9: Comparing the Chances of Obtaining Higher Degree Status in
Provincial Graduates’ Grandfathers and Fathers
(1) (2)
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit
Degreeyounger generation Degreeyounger generation
Degreeolder generation:
Purchased 1.237*** 1.331***
(0.0790) (0.0994)
Prefectural 1.946*** 1.989***
(0.0977) (0.124)
Prov./Nat. 2.922*** 3.301***
(0.172) (0.215)
GF-F dummy
(Grandfather-Father transition)
0.381***
(0.0639)
Interaction terms:
None × GF-F 0.507***
(0.110)
Purchased × GF-F 0.315***
(0.0916)
Prefectural × GF-F 0.419***
(0.127)
Prov./Nat. × GF-F -0.168
(0.257)
Observations 3640 3640
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.086
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Robust standard errors clustered at the family line level (i.e., by the provincial graduate’s unique
ID) are reported in parentheses.
history, including the Grandfather-Father transition for provincial graduates
who passed the provincial exam from 1810 to 1840, and the GGF-Grandfather
transition for provincial graduates who passed the provincial exam from 1840
to 1870. Provincial graduates’ ancestors in these subsample lived in about
the same period. If the the upward mobility in provincial graduates’ family
history was driven by decreased competition over time, then we shall not find
increased chances of getting higher degree status in Grandfather-Father tran-
sition. When I apply the same ordered logistic regression specifications as in
Table 1.9 to this subsample, the results are qualitatively the same as what
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are obtained using the full sample. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents the
results. Thus, this shows that the upward mobility in provincial graduates’
family history was not driven by time trend.
1.5.3 Multigenerational Mobility: Grandfather-Father to Son Tran-
sition of Degree Status
In my previous analysis, father-son transition matrices of degree status have
been constructed to describe the association between the fathers’ background
and the sons’ exam success. It is important to empirically examine the Marko-
vian assumption and the influence of family history beyond the father’s gen-
eration. As well noted in the literature, assessment based on only the parent-
to-child transition is subject to the risk of underestimating the socioeconomic
persistence over a longer horizon (e.g., Mare, 2011; Lindahl et al., 2012; Long
and Ferrie, 2013). In a group of individuals whose fathers all held the same sta-
tus, it is still possible that those who had lower-status grandfathers could have
lower chances of success. Indeed, the father’s status is the result of a process
that has considerable randomness, and two generations of success (Grandfa-
ther and Father) may be a much better signal of a family’s ability to help a son
pass provincial exams than looking only at the father’s outcome. I will show
that, in my sample, the grandfather’s degree holding was particularly helpful
to the son’s success when the father failed to obtain any degree. Downward
mobility faced by degree holders was overstated by the father-son transition
matrix.
In the multigenerational framework, an individual’s family background is spec-
ified by his father and grandfather’s degree statuses. Table 1.10 presents the
grandfather-father to son transition matrix of degree status. As a first result,
individuals in the Father generation whose both ancestors held no degrees
faced the least chance of success, while individuals for whom both ancestors
passed the provincial exam had the best opportunity. This latter group had a
52 percent chance of passing the provincial exam, 12 times higher than the 4
percent chance enjoyed by the former group.
To better illustrate the difference associated with grandfathers’ background, I
use Figure 1.7 to highlight some results in Table 1.10. Individuals in the Fa-
ther generation are divided into four groups according to their fathers’ degree
status. Each group corresponds to a subplot in the figure. Within each group,
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Table 1.10: Multigenerational Mobility: (GGF, Grandfather) to Father
Transition Matrix of Degree Status
GGF Grandfather Father’s Degree Status N. %
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None
Prov./Nat.
Prov./Nat.
52% 35% 9% 4% 23 1.30%
Prefectural 30% 38% 28% 5% 40 2.20%
Purchased 31% 44% 16% 9% 32 1.80%
None 12% 53% 24% 12% 17 0.90%
Group Overall 32% 41% 20% 7% 112 6%
Prov./Nat.
Prefectural
21% 59% 15% 5% 39 2.10%
Prefectural 15% 54% 18% 14% 170 9.30%
Purchased 16% 43% 24% 16% 152 8.40%
None 14% 44% 17% 25% 88 4.80%
Group Overall 16% 49% 20% 16% 449 25%
Prov./Nat.
Purchased
8% 33% 42% 17% 12 0.70%
Prefectural 11% 38% 33% 18% 110 6.00%
Purchased 9% 31% 40% 20% 286 15.70%
None 4% 31% 44% 21% 169 9.30%
Group Overall 8% 32% 40% 20% 577 32%
Prov./Nat.
None
50% 0% 50% 0% 2 0.10%
Prefectural 11% 29% 16% 44% 75 4.10%
Purchased 5% 29% 28% 38% 146 8.00%
None 4% 16% 20% 60% 459 25.20%
Group Overall 5% 21% 21% 53% 682 37%
N. 183 593 486 558 1820 100%
% 10.10% 32.60% 26.70% 30.70%
I compare the degree status distribution of two subgroups, the individuals
whose grandfathers held no degree (the green curve) and those whose grand-
fathers held prefectural level degrees (the red curve). I also compare them
with the group’s overall distribution (the dotted orange curve). As the results
show, in each group defined by fathers’ background, the subgroup with non-
degree holding grandfathers was less likely to succeed in the race for degrees,
no matter compared to the subgroup with grandfathers holding prefectural
level degrees, or the group’s overall level (in each subplot of Figure 1.7, the
green curve lies above both the red curve or the dotted orange curve).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that grandfathers’ degree sta-
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Figure 1.7: Cumulative Distribution of Degree Status in Grandfather and
Father Generations Conditional on Great Grandfather’s Degree Status
tus mattered even after controlling for the fathers’. The effect of grandfathers’
degree status was especially large when fathers held no degrees— those whose
grandfather held prefectural level degrees had a chance of 11% to pass the
provincial exam, more than twice as great as the group’s overall chance of 5%.
In addition, for those whose grandfathers held no degrees, their disadvantages
were especially severe in passing the provincial exam, with the only exception
in the group with fathers holding prefectural level degrees.33 Even in the group
of individuals whose fathers held provincial or national degrees, there was a
large difference in their chance of passing the provincial exam between those
had non-degree holding grandfathers and the rest (the the big jump at the
y-axis from the green to the red curve in the first subplot). These results seem
to suggest the special importance of family tradition of continuous investment
33Interestingly, in the total 16 types of family background, no types achieved a higher
than 10% chance of passing the provincial exam if neither their fathers nor grandfathers
obtained prefectural level degrees.
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in the exams over generations in improving the chance of the offspring to pass
the challenging provincial exam, though we need to be cautious about the
small size of this group.
To formally test the first order Markovian hypothesis, I perform the log-
likelihood ratio chi-square test (i.e. the “G-test”) to each of the four groups
(with all types of grandfather’s degree status included). The null hypothesis
that grandfathers’ degree status did not matter is rejected at p < .00001 for
the group where the Grandfather generation held no degrees.34 The null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected for the rest three subgroups at p < .05.35 That
grandfathers’ degree status mattered significantly when fathers held no degrees
is strongly supported by the test, especially given that the significance level is
reached with a moderate sample size (N = 682).
This result implies a higher level of persistence than what is suggested in
the father-son transition matrix. Specifically, a downward transition from the
degree holding grandfather to the non-degree holding father did not mean
that the son completely lost his advantage originated from his grandfather’s
success. He could still enjoy significant advantage over to his peers whose both
fathers and grandfathers held no degrees. In other words, the grandfather’s
success might not matter that much for the son if the father himself managed
to obtain a degree, but it became significantly helpful when the father failed.
Whether the grandfather’s degree merely reflected pre-existing advantages of
family resources, or it created new family advantages beneficial to the son’s suc-
cess, cannot be directly answered from the data. Historical studies found that
elite families and lineages in late Imperial China adopted a variety of strate-
gies to preserve their success, including wealth preservation through prudent
investment in land, fostering educational tradition though establishing lineage
endowment land for sponsoring exam preparation and degree purchases, in-
termarriage with other well-to-do families, and routine contribution to lineage
funds from its office holding members (Beattie, 1979; Zhang, 2010a, Chapter
3; Chang, 1962). In the case studies of the history of successful lineages, or in
contemporary observers’ discussions appearing in genealogies, some key turn-
34The result that the null hypothesis is rejected at p < .00001 is robust to the exclusion
of individuals whose grandfathers held provincial or national degrees. The reason for this
robustness check is because that subgroup only has two individuals.
35The p-values for the second and the third groups are around 0.1, but they are sensitive
to the inclusion of the individuals whose grandfathers held provincial or national degrees.
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ing points were typically identified in the trajectory of upward mobility from
well-to-do to well established educational tradition and persistently overrep-
resented success in the exam system.
In her study of the prestigious Chang lineage of Tongcheng county in Anhui
province, Beattie (1979, p.89-90) remarked that:
This was a crucial point in the family’s history, because the
fact that he [Chang Mu] inherited “extremely rich property” meant
that the elder of these two sons, Chang Ch’un (1540-1612), had
no need to bother about mundane matters like the family’s liveli-
hood but could devote himself instead to uninterrupted study. He
was rewarded in 1568 by becoming the first of the family to win a
chin-shih [national graduate] degree [and later became a provincial
official]. Chang Ch’un had thus raised himself and his immediate
family from being merely wealthy landowners to a social position in
the top layers of the country’s elite, and it was he not Chang Ying36
[the grandson of Ch’un], who was looked on as the true founder of
their eminence.
Not only did the Chang lineage survive the transition from Ming dynasty to
Qing dynasty, it became more prosperous and reached its climax of national
prominence as it produced a prime minister in two consecutive generations,
Chang Ying (1638-1708) and Chang Tingyu (1672-1755). The spectacular
success of Chang Ying’s sons was at least partially attributed to their parents’
heartfelt efforts in maintaining their educational tradition, as Beattie (1979,
p.89-90) vividly narrated:
Despite his [Chang Ying’s] distance from them [his sons] he
supervised their studies closely; they were to write nine essays per
month in carefully prescribed style and to send them to him in
Peking for correction. He added the severe warning that they were
not to get them written by other people, “which is the usual kind
of trick that the young men of great families go in for.” Nor were
they to waste too much their time writing poetry, at the expense of
serious preparation for the examination. This severe training was
reinforced by the admonitions of Chang Ying’s wife, whose efforts
to instill in her sons a proper sense of duty in office were once
publicly praised by the K’ang-si emperor.
36Chang Ying (1638-1708), the grandson of Chang Ch’un, obtained the national degree in
and rose to the very top of officialdom (president of the Board of Rites and grand secretary).
33
By analyzing the genealogy of the Chang lineage, Ho (1962, p.139) produced
a table summarizing the total number of Chang Ying’s male descendants and
their degree and office holding information in each of the succeeding six gen-
erations. Ho’s table is quoted in Table 1.11. Ho demonstrated that downward
mobility took place afterward: the percentage of degree-holders among Chang
Ying’s direct descendants dropped from 100% to about 30% in six generations,
and the percentage of those holding offices declined from 83.3% to 19.4%.
Table 1.11: Chang Ying’s Male Descendants in Six Generations
Gen. N.males
Degrees Officials %
Degree
holders
%
OfficialsNat.
Prov./
Tribute Pref. Purchased Total High Middle Low Total
2d 6 4 2 0 0 6 3 1 1 5 100% 83%
3d 14 4 8 0 1 13 3 8 0 11 93% 79%
4th 38 1 15 2 16 34 1 14 15 30 89% 79%
5th 77 2 6 10 28 46 0 10 13 23 60% 30%
6th 101 1 5 9 22 37 0 12 21 33 37% 33%
7th 113 2 6 6 20 34 0 11 11 22 30% 19%
Note: This table is adapted from Table 17 of Ho (1962, p.17). Classification of officials: High (rank 3B or above), Middle
(rank 7B to 4A), Low (rank 8A or below).
Still, this represented a level of success far beyond the average level among the
population. Indeed, six members of the Chang lineage are found in my sample
of alumni directories, out of which four were immediate descendants of Chang
Ying (in the 6th and 7th generations).37 In my sample, they constitute 13.3%
of the total 45 provincial graduates from their hometown, Tongcheng county,
Anhui. Moreover, as Beattie’s work showed, although social differentiation
within lineage widened as its size increased over time, in each generation, a
small group of affluent and well-educated members formed its nucleus and
actively managed the lineage’s resources and affairs. In fact, the evidence is
overwhelming that from the fourth generation onward 14 to 17 individuals
passed at least the prefectural exams and at least 20 purchased the degree. In
other words, the lineage maintained a constant share of the available degrees
through four generations. The lineage as a distinctive social group survived
into the 20th century. In addition, membership into the lineage nucleus was
37The four immediate descendants of Chang Ying are Congxian and Tongdeng in the 6th
generation, and Jialing and Shaohua in the 7th generation. In addition, there are another
two members of the Chang lineage, Yongxi in the 6th and Fuyu in the 9th generation.
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usually associated with success in the exam system and in civil service careers.
From this perspective, the exam system also provided a meritocratic basis for
allocating resources and status within lineages.
1.6 Conclusion
The extremely high-stake civil service examination in Imperial China was a
meritocratic system where almost every male was allowed to participate and
exams were anonymously evaluated. At the same time, education and exam
participations required large and long private investments. These costs meant
that there was no real equality of opportunity; the process in fact in favored
the elite. The open access and objective evaluation implied, at least in theory,
that even the humblest member in the society could have a chance to rise up
through the system if he was talented and hardworking. But in reality the
elite could gain an advantage by investing enough resources to improve their
sons’ chance of success.
Just how much mobility did the system end up inducing? To answer this
question, I started by estimating the sons’ probability distribution of degree
status conditional on their fathers’ degree status in the general population.
The estimates suggest that candidates whose fathers obtained higher degree
status enjoyed substantial higher chances of success. Sons of provincial gradu-
ates were eight times more likely to pass the provincial exam than candidates
whose fathers held prefectural level degrees or the purchased degrees, who,
in turn, were about eight times more likely to pass the provincial exam than
classically educated candidates whose fathers held no degrees.
A similar pattern also holds for prefectural level exams. Candidates whose
father passed the prefectural level exams were about seven times more likely
to pass the exam than classically educated candidates whose fathers held no
degrees. But only about 3% of adult males ever participated in the lowest
level exams, therefore were considered as classically educated. The other 97%
who never participated had no chance of success. These results show that se-
vere stratification took place across different groups defined by fathers’ degree
status. Those whose fathers achieved higher degree status had substantial
advantages in getting better degree status.
To further investigate how persistent were these advantages, I examine the
family history of degree status of those who succeeded in the exam system,
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which is crucial for understanding the multigenerational dynamics. Using a
sample of successful candidates in 14 Jiangnan provincial exams, I collected
their family histories of degree status in the immediate paternal line going
back three generations. Degree status mobility tables are constructed for each
father-son transition. I found ancestors of these provincial graduates had over-
represented exam success, compared to individuals in the general population
whose fathers had the same degree status. In other words, stratification did
not only take place across different groups defined by fathers’ degree status,
but also existed within each group, where a small subgroup of individuals en-
joyed substantially higher chance of success than the group’s overall level. In
fact, competition in the provincial exams provided a natural sampling proce-
dure that selected out families that had higher chances of success from the
overall population. Ancestors of provincial graduates in my sample belonged
to these overrepresented subgroups. The level of overrepresentation ranged
from 6 times to 20 times in different groups defined by fathers’ degree status.
For example, in my sample, individuals in the grandfathers’ generation whose
fathers held no degrees had a 2% chance of passing the provincial exam, while
in the general population, classically educated candidates whose fathers held
no degrees only had a chance of less than 0.1%. This corresponded to a level
of overrepresentation of about 20 times.
Moreover, these advantages further increased from the grandfathers’ genera-
tion to the fathers’ generation. Families in the sample as a whole experienced
consecutive upward mobility across generations. Analysis showed that the
level of upward mobility was much higher than the Markovian benchmark
(that assumes the unchanged transition matrix as in the previous generation),
and the reason was mainly attributed to the higher level of persistence of
exam success enjoyed by sons of degree holders. The fact that families in my
sample enjoyed substantial advantages compared to their corresponding family
background group since two generations ago, and then further increased this
advantage, illustrates the persistence of the stratification.
Lastly, I explicitly examined the the Markovian assumption and the influence
of family history beyond the father’s generation. The results show that grand-
fathers’ degree status mattered even after controlling for the fathers’. The
effect of grandfathers’ degree status was especially large when fathers held no
degrees. In other words, the grandfather’s success might not matter that much
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for the son if the father himself managed to obtain a degree, but it became
significantly helpful when the father failed. Consequently, a higher level of
persistence is implied than that which is suggested in the father-son transition
matrix.
All these findings suggest that substantial advantages were enjoyed by families
with a better established tradition of education investment and exam success.
And multigenerational analysis reveals a much higher level of persistence than
what could be captured in analyzing only two adjacent generations. My in-
terpretation is that given the extremely high stake payoff allocated through
the exam system, fierce competition raised the bar so high that even small
disadvantages caused by lack of resources became fatal.
The variety of strategies that elite families and lineage developed and perfected
over time further strengthened the status quo. Consequently, for the humble to
climb up the ladder of exam success required continuous efforts over multiple
generations to gradually establish the family tradition of educational invest-
ment and exam preparation, so that sons in the future generations would be
more effectively educated and guided in the exam preparation process. As the
reward for multigenerational efforts in climbing up the ladder, families that
succeeded in rising from well-to-do to well established educational tradition
enjoyed more persistent success. This persistence itself was a consequence of
meritocratic selection— their persistent success was associated with the family
knowing how to raise their sons to be competitive exam candidates.
The Chinese experience under the Imperial exam system therefore differed
dramatically from what is described in the proverb “from shirtsleeves to shirt-
sleeves in three generations” as quoted by Becker and Tomes (1986) and Stokey
(1998). Rather, it took longer to rise and fell far more slowly. So although
nominally everyone was allowed to participate, in any given generation, effec-
tive competition mostly took place among individuals with enough resources.
While the anonymous evaluation provided by the exam system still guaran-
teed meritocratic competition among candidates who had enough resources,
promoting social mobility, especially within one generation, seemed not to be
one of the primary functions actually accomplished by the system.
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C h a p t e r 2
WAS THE CHINESE IMPERIAL CIVIL BUREAUCRACY
MERITOCRATIC? FAMILY BACKGROUND, EXAM
SUCCESS, AND OFFICIAL CAREER ATTAINMENT IN 19TH
CENTURY JIANGNAN
When taking a bird’s-eye view of the vast stretch of China’s
history, one is struck by the persistence and stability of one endur-
ing feature of Chinese society that might be called officialism, the
most conspicuous sign of which was the uninterrupted continuity
of a ruling class of scholar-officials. —Etienne Balazs (1964, p.6)
2.1 Introduction
A distinctive feature of Imperial China was its nonhereditary bureaucracy. To
recruit the ablest men to staff the imperial bureaucracy and to prevent heredi-
tary aristocracy, the state regularly held Imperial Civil Service Examinations.1
This institution has been widely recognized the earliest example of administra-
tive meritocracy. Not only it was admired by Enlightenment writers such as
Voltaire, scholars suggested that it also partly influenced civil service reforms
in 19th century Europe, where patronage was replaced by more merit-based
recruitment (Kazin, Edwards, and Rothman, 2011, p.142; Teng, 1943).
Whether the reality of the imperial exam and bureaucracy was consistent with
the meritocratic ideal, however, remains an open question. First, although en-
tering the bureaucracy through exam success was the most respected path,
there were alternative gateways to public office especially through office pur-
chase, which facilitated exchange of wealth for power and status with full legal
sanction.2 Second, although written exams were graded anonymously, bureau-
cratic appointment and further career advancement allowed family resources
and connections to directly affect outcomes.
In Chapter 1, I focused on the imperial exam system which is known to have
had open competitions and anonymous grading. It did not, however, provide
1The Imperial Examination started in 605. In Song dynasty (960-1279), it was expanded
to the primary mechanism for bureaucratic recruitment. See Chaffee (1985), Bol (1990) and
Elman (1991) for more details.
2This institution will be discussed in the Historical Review section.
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equality of opportunity since education and exam participation were privately
funded and costly. I found families with a longer history of educational invest-
ment and exam success enjoyed substantial and persistent advantages. While
it was still possible to rise, it required continuous efforts over generations. Pro-
moting social mobility, especially in one generation, seemed not to be one of
the primary functions actually accomplished by the system.
In this Chapter, I track a sample of provincial graduates’ further progress in
the national exams and their official career attainment about 20 years after
they passed the provincial exam, with a focus on the role played by family
background. The results suggest that provincial graduates’ family background
contributed to their progress in the national exam and career advancement in
different ways.
On one hand, I find that the competition in the national exam resembles a
meritocratic competition when family background is measured only by the fa-
ther’s status. To do so I use two proxy measures of ability at the provincial
exam: the age of passing the provincial exam and the provincial ranking per-
centile. I show these measures play an important role in predicting national
exam success. It is also true that provincial graduates’ family background had
contributed to their provincial success, as those with more prestigious family
background passed the provincial exam at younger ages with better ranking.
While provincial graduates whose fathers held more prestigious status passed
the national exam at higher chances, after controlling for these two proxy
measures of ability, the father’s background was not statistically significant
in predicting the national exam success. However, when we apply a more in-
formative measure of family background, the highest status achieved by the
father, grandfather, and great grandfather, the family background measure
remains significant in predicting national exam success, even after controlling
for the proxy measures of competence. Combining these results with those of
Chapter 1, I argue meritocratic competition in national exams did not gen-
eralize to lower-level exams below the provincial level. Provincial graduates
were scholars whose academic competences were proven in the challenging
provincial exams, and they were well sponsored by the state and their commu-
nity. In other words, the inequality of opportunity was substantially reduced
conditional on passing the provincial exam.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence showing that provincial graduates
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with more prestigious family backgrounds, especially those whose fathers held
higher offices, had significantly more successful official careers. This result
remains significant after controlling for age and rank at the provincial exam
and whether or not the candidates further passed the national exam. The
advantage associated with fathers’ higher offices was more pronounced when
the provincial graduates failed to pass the national exam. While the fathers’
higher office holding mattered for the chance of achieving a decent entry-
level position, it contributed even more for achieving positions which were
higher than the entry level and therefore required some promotions. These
results thus cast serious doubt on the thesis that the imperial civil service was
meritocratic. I suggest that nepotism and use of office purchase could be the
mechanisms underlying the significant contribution of fathers’ office holding
to the provincial gradates’ more successful career attainment.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide a historical
review of the imperial civil bureaucracy and official careers. In Section 2.3, I
describe the data source. In Section 2.4, I examine the relationship between
family background, proxy measures of ability in the provincial exam, and the
competition at national exams. In Section 2.5, I analyze the role of family
background played in provincial graduates’ official career attainment.
2.2 Historical Review
In this section, I aim to briefly review historical and institutional facts related
to civil service careers in the imperial bureaucracy under the Qing dynasty
(1644-1911). The imperial civil service exam system under the Qing dynasty
has been review in Chapter 1.
2.2.1 Overview of the Civil Service in Imperial Bureaucracy
The imperial bureaucracy can be divided into two parts, the court (i.e., central
government) in Beijing, and provincial and local governments. The Ministry
of Civil Service (libu) was in charge of personnel management of civil offi-
cials, including initial bureaucratic recruitment, performance assessment, and
facilitating the emperor’s promotion and administrative punishment decisions.
Although the empire experienced rapid population growth, the number of of-
ficial posts was relatively stable due to strict regulation. In total, there were
about 20,000 official posts. According to the statistics of Chang (1955, p.34-
42), in 1880, there were about 2600 Han Chinese officials and about than 3000
40
Bannermen officials in the court.3 In provincial and local government, there
were about 13,000 officials, mostly Han Chinese.4 There were also about 7,500
military officers, which were not part of the civil service but under the Ministry
of War (bingbu) and thus are beyond the scope of this study.
All the civil official posts were classified into a nine-rank system, from the
lowest rank 9 to the highest rank 1. Each of these nine primary ranks were
further divided into two sub-ranks, A (the higher) and B (the lower). In
addition, some minor offices were classified as unranked (weiruliu), these were
the humblest official posts such as jailers and storehouse keepers. Following
the definition of Ho (1962, p.24-25), these ranks aggregated into three strata.
The upper stratum consists of high offices from 3B to 1A, including the top
three officials in each province and vice ministers and ministers in the central
bureaucracy. These high officials had some hereditary privilege (yin) that
granted their descendants civil offices that were about four ranks lowers than
their own (i.e., 7 to 5).5 This privilege was normally limited to one descendent
only and did not extend beyond two generations. The medium stratum consists
of officials ranked from 7A, the rank of a county magistrate, to 4A, the rank of a
prefect. These officials had considerable responsibility, power and importance,
and they constituted the backbone of the bureaucracy. The lower stratum
consisted of officials less than or equal to rank 7B. Given that there few offices
in the rank 7B, most of these low officials were in rank 8, 9 or unranked.6
Table 2.1 presents the number of civil officials by rank in 1880, which is adapted
3Since the emperors were Manchu, many official posts were ethnicity-specific, divided
between Han Chinese and the Bannermen, including Manchu, Mongol and Han Bannermen.
This led to an overrepresentation of the latter.
4According to some calculations based on Chang’s figures, only about 2% of the provin-
cial and local officials were Bannermen. A majority of them (about 75%) held key provincial
and local posts, such as county magistrates, prefects, and circuit intendants.
5According to the Draft of Qing History (v.110), the offices granted to descendants of
high officials were about four ranks lower than that of their offices. For a high official of
rank 1A, his descendant was granted an office of rank 5B in the court or an office of rank
5A in provincial and local government. For a high official of rank 3B, his descendant was
granted an office of 7B in the court or that of 7A in provincial and local government.
6In this Chapter, I use 7A as the cutoff for the medium stratum of the bureaucracy.
However, given most positions in rank 7 were rank 7A, the difference should not be large if
an alternative cutoff of 7B was used. I examined the 1873 winter edition of the Complete
Register of Qing Officials (Da Qing Jinshen Quanshu). As specified in the section of quota
for official posts (guanque), the number of 7A posts (1444) was more than 10 times larger
than the number of 7B posts (96) in provincial or local government. While these numbers
were quotas instead of actual count, they suggested that the number of posts of rank 7A
was substantially more than that of rank 7B.
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Table 2.1: Number of Civil Officials in Imperial Bureaucracy by Rank in 1880
Category Rank
Court
(Han Chinese)
Provincial/
Local Combined
N. % N. % N. %
High
1 11 0.4 10 0.1 21 0.1
2 16 0.6 34 0.3 50 0.3
3 10 0.4 41 0.3 51 0.3
Subtotal 37 1.4 85 0.7 122 0.8
Medium
4 16 0.6 277 2.1 293 1.9
5 545 20.8 449 3.5 994 6.4
6 1,307 49.8 258 2.0 1,565 10.0
7 499 19.0 2,570 19.8 3,069 19.6
Subtotal 2,367 90.3 3,554 27.3 5,921 37.9
Low
8 91 3.5 5,608 43.1 5,699 36.5
9 & unranked 127 4.8 3,760 28.9 3,887 24.9
Subtotal 218 8.3 9,368 72.0 9,586 61.3
Total 2,622 100 13,007 100 15,629 100
Note: Adapted from Chang (1955, p.34-42). The source is the Complete
Register of Qing Officials (Da Qing Jinshen Quanshu), 1880 edition.
from Chang (1955, p.34-42).7 As shown in the table, officials in the court were
substantially higher ranked on average. While 91.7% of officials in the court
were in the medium or high stratum, this percentage in provincial and local
government was 28%. In addition, the total number of offices equal to or
higher than rank 7 was about 6,000. As estimated in Chapter 1, the number
of (living) provincial graduates was about 17,000 to 18,000. Together, these
numbers imply that it was very competitive for a provincial graduate (juren)
to obtain a decent appointment of rank 7 or above, especially considering that
a substantial proportion of these posts were allocated though office sales, which
was part of the contribution system that will be discussed later. Lastly, it is
worth noting that high officials only constituted about 1% of the civil officials.
They enjoyed significant power and reported directly to the emperor.8
7The data source is the 1880 edition of the Complete Register of Qing Officials (Da Qing
Jinshen Quanshu).
8They had the privilege to directly communicate with the emperor through secret palace
memorials (mizhe).
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2.2.2 Bureaucratic Recruitment after Exam Success
The Ministry of Civil Service managed the appointment procedure (buxuan)
that allocated entry-level vacancies in the civil bureaucracy to various types of
candidates, including national graduates (jinshi), provincial graduates (juren),
qualified tribute students (gongsheng), and those who purchased candidacies
through office sales.9
Among those who obtained their candidacy through exam success, the national
graduates had the most favorable appointment opportunities. Most of them
could obtain a decent appointment equal to or higher than rank 7A, and they
waited for far less time than provincial graduates. Puk and Li (2015) provided
a statistic about the initial appointments of the 319 national graduates in
the class of 1886. About 28% of the top performers were selected into the
prestigious Hanlin Academy, which was the training ground for the highest
echelon of officialdom” (Elman, 1989, p.383).10 They spent three years at
the Academy and then received immediate appointment. The next 32% of
national graduates were recruited into the court. The bulk of these (86%)
were appointed as interns for the position of secretary (zhushi, rank 6A) in the
Ministries.11 Another 33% of national graduates were assigned to provinces as
probationary county magistrates (rank 7A) supervised by provincial officials.
The last 6% of national graduates’ initial placements were unspecified. It is
worth noting that most of these placements were probationary.12 As estimated
by Watt (1972) and Man-Cheong (2004), the average waiting time for a formal
9The actual appointment procedure was much more complicated. There were also other
types of candidates including officials returning from mourning period and sick leave, and
officials who held lower offices but qualified for promotion. Moreover, it is worth noting
that only a subset of official posts was for initial appointment. For example, the about
1300 county magistrate positions were classified into different categories according to their
difficulty of governance. Only the simpler positions (about 70%) were allocated through
the Ministry of Civil Service for entry-level appointment, while those more challenging
positions (the rest, about 30%) were only for those who already accumulated experience in
simpler counties. Provincial governors played significant roles in making appointments for
these positions. See Liu (1993), Zhang (2010b), and Guy (2010) for more details about the
appointment procedure, the post designations and the role of provincial governors.
10They would spend three years in Hanlin Academy to receive advanced training and
to perform secretarial and literary work for the court. Three years later, they would be
evaluated and receive immediate appointment.
11The period for internship (shiyong) was three years. They would be evaluated in the
end of the internship and those qualified could register in Ministry of Civil Service for actual
appointment.
12The difference was particularly large for those assigned to provinces, since they often
worked on temporary tasks other than county magistrates.
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appointment was about 10 years for national graduates.
Because national graduates hoarded the best posts, the appointment opportu-
nity for provincial graduates who did not pass in the national exam was very
limited. The Qianlong emperor remarked in 1765,
For provincial graduates to be appointed as county magistrates,
they need to wait [in the appointment procedure of Ministry of Civil
Service] up to more than 30 years. Their youth and energy were
wasted in the waiting... Each provincial exam graduates 1,290 can-
didates, which means, there are over 5,000 new provincial gradu-
ates every ten years. In those ten years, not even 500 are employed
in office. Aside from those passing the national exam, there are
still several thousand waiting. Over time, this led to an enormous
blockage [in the employment channel] given the fixed number of po-
sitions? In the dead of night, I often try to think of ways to resolve
this problem...13
In 1766, an additional placement procedure, “Great Selection” (datiao), was
implemented every six to nine years. It reviewed the provincial graduates who
failed in the national exam for three or more times.14 Those who were rated
as the first class could be assigned to provinces as candidates for county mag-
istrates, and those rated as the second class could be considered as candidates
for educational positions, mostly instructors (jiaoxu, rank 8A) and assistant
instructors (xundao, rank 8B) in local government schools. While this addi-
tional channel might seem like a good path to office for provincial graduates
without a j inshi degree, given the limited number of positions, their prospects
remained clouded. New “blockages” emerged in this channel as the number
of selected candidates surpassed the actual placement capacity (Zhang, 2012).
In fact, many provincial graduates resorted to the office purchase instead of
waiting.
2.2.3 Overview of the Contribution System
Although entering imperial bureaucracy though success in the civil service
exam was recognized as the respectable “orthodox path” (zhengtu), the con-
13Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty, Qianlong reign, v.745. The translation was
mostly quoted from Man-Cheong (2004, p.38), except for the first two sentences.
14For a more details about the institution of Great Selection, please refer to Ma (2011),
Zhang and Wang (2012), and Zhang (2012). Zhang (2012) tabulated all 17 selections from
the first selection in 1766 to the last one in 1898. Starting from the eighth selection in 1817,
it was implemented regularly every nine years.
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tribution system (juanna) offered an alternative gateway to public offices.15
It facilitated exchange of wealth for power and status with full legal sanction,
though nominally these transactions were designated as the state’s rewards
to encourage public-spirited voluntary contributions. In fact, as Kaske (2008,
p.287) remarked, under the Qing dynasty, the contribution system “penetrated
the whole imperial bureaucracy including appointment, advancement, com-
mendation and reinstatement (after dismissal due to punishment) of officials.”
The contribution system consisted of two components that were codified sepa-
rately (Xu, 1950; Kaske, 2008; Wu, 2013; Zhang, 2010a). Routine Precedents
(Xianxing Shili) regulated the sales of the prefectural-level degrees of jiang-
sheng and gongsheng (i.e., the student status at Imperial Academy), brevet
and honorific titles, and privileges for current officials such as promotions and
exemptions from administrative punishments. These sales were available year
round. Temporary Precedents (Zanxing Shili) arose when emergencies such
as wars and natural disasters sparked short-term fundraising campaigns. In
these campaigns, candidacies for a wide range of substantive offices (shizhi) up
to the rank of 4A were available for purchase, from the unranked minor posts
to the key positions in the middle stratum of the bureaucracy, such as county
magistrates (7A), prefects (4B) and circuit intendants (4A) in the provincial
and local government, and secretaries (6A), vice directors (5B) and directors
(5A) in the Six Ministries in the court.16
It is important to clarify that after purchasing a certain substantive office, the
buyer did not get immediate appointment to the office, he only obtained the
candidacy to enter the appointment procedure administrated by the Ministry
of Civil Service.17 As the monopolistic seller, the state extracted substantial
revenue through selling privileges (huayang) for accelerated appointment. As
Kaske (2008, p.295) illustrated, in 1851, the basic price for a jiansheng degree
holder to purchase a county magistrate candidacy was 3,330 taels of silver,
but it cost additional 6,192 taels to buy the priority for fastest appointment,
15Xu (1950) is the pioneering study of the contribution system. Recent advances by
Kaske (2008, 2011, 2012), Wu (e.g., 2013), and Zhang (2010, 2013) have greatly expanded
our understanding of this institution. In particular, these studies show that the prevalence
and significance of office purchase was beyond what had previously been recognized.
16Xu (1950) provided a comprehensive survey of Temporary Precedents and tabulated
price lists for major official posts for sale over time.
17It is also worth noting that under no circumstances could the office holder resell the
office, or bequeath the office to his sons. This was quite different from the venality of ancien
régime France.
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which almost tripled the basic price. Since the state significantly oversold
candidacies, purchasing additional privileges became necessary for getting an
actual appointment.
2.2.4 Magnitude of the Use of Purchase
To what extent did the office sales serve as the entrance into imperial bu-
reaucracy? Using the directories of officials, Ch’u (1962) and Kondo (1963)
tabulated the degree status of county and department magistrates. As Zhang
(2010a, p.92-99) pointed out, degree status can only serve as a partial indica-
tor of office purchase. Magistrates who held the purchased Imperial Academy
status (i.e., jiansheng or gongsheng) were likely to have purchased their offices.
For magistrates who held provincial degree or tribute status through exam suc-
cess, although they were qualified for bureaucratic recruitment, they often also
resorted to office purchase, given that the chance of getting an appointment
without purchase was low.18
Table 2.2 presents these results, but we should bear in mind that although all
the individuals counted as having purchased an office or degree surely did so,
some of those who are counted in the pure merit column likely also did so.19 If
we count all those who held the purchased Imperial Academy status as office
purchasers, and considering that many provincial graduates, tribute students
by merit and in the other category could also be purchasers, it seems safe to
say that at least 25% of magistrates purchased their posts in any of these years.
The percentage of those who held the purchased Imperial Academy status was
relatively stable at around 20% until 1854, and it almost doubled in the years
of 1862 and 1876. At the same time, the percentage of national graduates de-
creased significantly. This change was likely to be associated with aggressive
office sale campaigns during the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). In fact, this
period also witnessed changes in state-province relations when provincial gov-
ernors gained more influence in bureaucratic personnel management, as they
18Wu (2013, p.130-131) discussed such a case. Du Fengzhi, who passed the Zhejiang
provincial exam in 1844, registered in the Ministry of Civil Service for appointment in 1855.
After 8 years of frustration in waiting, in 1863, he decided to purchase the candidacy for
county magistrate with privilege for accelerated appointment. Three years later, in 1866,
he obtained the actual appointment to a county in Guangdong province.
19Zhang (2010a, p.92-99) synthesized Ch’u and Kondo’s results and provided very helpful
discussions. Table 2.2 is adapted from Table 2.2 in Zhang (2010a, p.95). The year of 1724
is not included, when tribute student by merit constituted 22% of total magistrates, much
higher than all other years.
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were relied upon for organizing defense and warfare. For example, provincial
governors became more and more capable of getting their private secretaries
(muliao) recruited into the bureaucracy through petition to the emperor, al-
though this had been previously prohibited to prevent nepotism (Guan, 2013,
p.58-72).
Table 2.2: Degree Status of County and Department Magistrates over Time
Year National
Graduate
Provincial
Graduate
Tribute
Student
by Merit
Purchased
Imperial
Academy
Status
Others Total
1745 42% 21% 7% 19% 11% 1,430
1770 47% 26% 7% 16% 4% 1,465
1786 52% 17% 5% 20% 6% 1,446
1801 49% 21% 6% 16% 8% 1,456
1840 51% 14% 5% 20% 9% 1,456
1850 34% 25% 6% 22% 14% 1,422
1854 37% 25% 5% 23% 9% 1,420
1862 19% 22% 7% 39% 13% 1,379
1876 21% 22% 7% 42% 9% 1,416
Note: This table was adapted from Table 2.2 in Zhang (2010a, p.95), who syn-
thesized the results in Ch’u (1962) and Kondo (1963). The “Others” category
includes those who held licentiate degree, those who were appointed through
military merit, those who were runners and clerks, and other miscellaneous
small categories. Many people in the “Others” category were likely to be pur-
chasers.
As discussed before, the contribution system penetrated the imperial bureau-
cracy beyond initial recruitment. This meant that even those who obtained
their initial appointment through exam success, might make contributions to
help their career advancement, including purchasing a higher office, recorded
merits (jiaji jilu) and reinstatement and atonement (juanfu and shuzui) after
they received punishment or demotion. Zhang (2010a) collected a sample of
curricula vitae of officials who achieved the rank of prefect (4B) or higher.
These curricula vitae were part of the Ministry of Civil Service personnel file
collection, and recorded contributions. Table 2.3 presents the frequency of
purchase by degree status, adapted from Zhang’s results. First, the degree
status composition shows that national graduates were still the largest group
of officials (about one third of the sample). Purchased jiansheng degree holders
were the second largest group (21%) almost double the size of that of provincial
graduates (11%). Second, the results suggest that although purchased jian-
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sheng degree holders used purchase to further advance their careers the most
(72% on average), the use of purchase among provincial graduates was also
substantial (41% on average). Even officials who held national degrees made
contributions especially in the later periods (after 1852). Third, there was a
clear trend of increasing use of purchase among provincial or national grad-
uates over time. This trend seems coincide with the trend reflected in Table
2.2 that the percentage of national graduates among county and department
magistrates declined while that of purchased Imperial Academy status holders
increased in the years of 1862 and 1876. These trends are consistent with the
increasing use of office purchase in the second half of the 19th century.
Table 2.3: Frequency of Office/Privilege Purchase by Degree Status among
Officials Ranked Equal or Higher than Prefect (4B)
Period
Degree Status Composition Frequency of Office/PrivilegePurchase by Degree Status
National
Graduate
Provincial
Graduate
Purchased
Jiansheng
N.
National
Graduate
Provincial
Graduate
Purchased
Jiansheng
1723-1735 35% 9% 27% 259 7% 25% 83%
1757-1768 22% 9% 25% 293 3% 11% 36%
1793-1807 26% 16% 15% 305 0% 25% 80%
1829-1849 50% 9% 12% 220 6% 47% 73%
1852-1871 37% 12% 19% 263 33% 68% 84%
1883-1887 32% 9% 24% 301 14% 77% 85%
Overall 33% 11% 21% 1641 11% 41% 72%
Note: Adapted from Zhang (2010a, p.95).
2.3 Data Description
This study uses the same dataset of provincial graduates as in Chapter 1, which
is constructed from the two archival sources of Jiangnan provincial exams in
the 19th century: the official rosters (Ti Ming Lu) and alumni directories
(Tongnian Lu or Tongnian Chilu). Out of the 42 provincial exams held in
Jiangnan in the 19th century, this dataset enumerates the successful candidates
for 39 of them, with a total of 5,623 provincial graduates (about 144 per exam).
For 14 of these exams, the dataset contains family background information,
such as degree and office holding status of provincial graduates’ immediate
paternal ancestors going three generations back.
I added information about their success in the national exam, using a dataset
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constructed from the lists of national graduates compiled by Jiang (2007).
These data sets give me the 1580 individuals from Jiangnan who passed the
national exams from the beginning of the 19th century up to the last national
exam in 1904. These have to be matched to the provincial exam lists.
Matching these datasets accurately is challenging due to name changes, variant
Chinese characters, and data entry errors on very similar Chinese characters.
To improve matching quality, I extensively searched the Erudition Chinese
Local Gazetteers Database to utilize biographies and cross references made by
gazetteer compilers.
To increase the matching rates as well as the matching accuracy, I collected
a supplementary dataset of provincial graduates from two additional types of
sources20 that contain provincial graduates from Jiangnan not covered in my
main dataset. Altogether, I matched 1381 out of the total 1580 provincial
graduates, which gives a matching rate of 87.4%. Among these 1381 matches,
1082 are from my main dataset of 5,623 provincial graduates, which corre-
sponds to a national exam pass rate of 19.2%. The rest of the 299 matches
are from the supplementary dataset, including 191 provincial graduates who
came from Jiangnan but passed the provincial exam in the capital. More
than 160 out of the total 1381 matches were recovered manually, including
52 occasions of name changes and 36 cases of duplication of names. Figure
A5 in the Appendix illustrates the matching rate and source of matching over
time (in each national exam). In the beginning of the period, matching rates
are lower because there are national graduates who obtained their provincial
degrees before the starting year of my dataset of provincial graduates. This
early censoring does not affect my ability to track national exam success for
the provincial graduates covered in my dataset. Apart from the left censoring,
unmatched observations seem to be fairly randomly distributed over time.
In a related study, Jiang and Kung (2015) collected a dataset of provincial
provincial graduates from the exam essays collected by Gu (1992). While they
have done careful analysis to address the potential of sample selection issues,
the ultimate answer to this question relies on the complete lists of provincial
graduates. Given that for the provincial exams covered in my sample, I have
the complete lists of successful candidates, my sample is ideal for examining
20These two sources are the Draft Gazetteers of Jiangsu Province (Jiangsu Sheng Tongzhi
Gao) and Official Rosters of Shuntian Provincial Exams (Shuntian Xiangshi Ti Ming Lu).
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the sample selection issue of the examination essays collection. To do so,
I collected the lists of provincial graduates whose exam essays are included
in the collection, and matched them with my sample. I find evidence that
a sizable sample section bias did exist: exam essays of provincial graduates
who obtained higher offices are significantly more likely to be preserved in the
collection of Gu (1992). Given the results of this paper that fathers’ higher
office holding are strongly associated with the sons’ more successful official
career attainment, the sample selection issue of the exam essays collection can
bias towards an underestimation of the importance of family background. In
Appendix B.2, I present the detailed analysis of the sample selection bias of
the exam essays collection.
2.4 Family Background and the Competition in National Exams
Although passing the provincial exam was a substantial achievement that qual-
ified for bureaucratic recruitment, the ultimate glory was reserved for the jinshi
degree, granted to those who conquered the national exam. In this section,
I study to what extent provincial graduates’ family backgrounds contributed
to their chances of passing the national exam. To do so I start by proposing
two proxy measures of a provincial graduate’s academic competence, the age
at passing the provincial exam and the provincial ranking percentile. I then
show that these two measures are predictive of national exam success. I ex-
amine how family resources contributed to success in the provincial exam—
those with more prestigious family backgrounds passed the provincial exam at
younger age with better ranking. Lastly, I examine the relation between proxy
measures of competence, family background and national exam success.
2.4.1 Two Proxy Measures of Competence
Age at passing the provincial exam and provincial ranking percentiles are two
proxy measures of a provincial graduate’s academic competence. Preparing
for the Imperial Exam was a long and challenging journey. Most candidates
began their education when 5 or 6 years old and started participating in exams
at the prefectural in their late teens. Repeated participation was allowed. The
combination of a fixed number of winners and intense competition implies it
was common to fail many times.21
21Chu (2015) studies the practice of returning marked exam papers to failed candidates,
which created a sense of accountability among individual examiners.
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Consider two candidates who had been provided with the same educational
opportunities taking a given exam.22 One would expect that the one who
passes at younger age is more talented and had a higher chance of success in
more advanced exams. One would also expect that among candidates who
pass the exam in the same year, other things being equal, the one who obtains
a higher ranking has higher human capital and will be more competitive for
later exams. Testing this second hypothesis is made more complicated by
repeated participation. Indeed, a candidate who passes at a very young age
(his first attempt) with lower ranking could be more talented and competitive
than another candidate who endures repeated failures before passing with a
higher ranking. In other words, without controlling for other variables (esp.
age at passing), provincial ranking itself can be only a noisy measure of ability.
This is particularly the case given that provincial ranking percentile and age
at passing are only weakly correlated in the data.23
To see how well these two proxy measures can predict whether a provincial
graduate could further pass the national exam, I divide the sample of provin-
cial graduates into different groups according to the proxy measures, and then
track each group’s cumulative national exam pass rate over time. For each
provincial cohort, which consists of provincial graduates who passed in the
same year, I compute age percentile (0 as the youngest, and 1 as the oldest)
and ranking percentile (0 as the lowest ranked, and 1 for the highest ranked—
the No.1 winner or xieyuan).24 The 4,280 individuals who passed the Jiang-
nan provincial exam before 1880 are used in the analysis of national exam
outcomes, since provincial graduates’ national exam experience is censored by
22An underlying assumption is that the content in the national exam was similar to
that in the provincial exam, so that one’s performance in the provincial exam can well
predict his performance in the national exam. This assumption seems to be reasonable
according to historical facts. In the national exam stage, the Metropolitan Exam (huishi)
was the one to determine whether one could pass, followed by the Palace Exam (dianshi)
that determined the formal ranking of successful candidates but did not fail anyone who
passed the Metropolitan Exam. The Metropolitan Exam and the provincial exam shared
the same format (e.g., configuration of sessions, question format and essay style) and exam
curriculum, and were both anonymously graded.
23In the pre-Taiping period (1804-1852), the correlation coefficient is r = 0.049 (p =
0.013, N = 2570). In the post-Taiping period (1864-1903), the correlation coefficient is
r = −0.051 (p = 0.005, N = 3012). The statistical significance of the difference between
these two correlation coefficients and its implications will be discussed in the Appendix B.1.
24More precisely, I rank the individuals in each cohort from the youngest (Rankingage =
1) to the oldest (Rankingage = N). And I rank the individuals in each cohort from from
highest (Rankingprov = 1) to lowest (Rankingprov = N). Then I compute the percentile
according to each ranking, Percentilek = RankingkN−1 , where k ∈ {age, prov}.
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the abolition of the exam system in 1905.
Figure 2.1 presents the results separately for each proxy measure. The x-axis
is the k-th national exam after the provincial exam, which is the scale of time
suitable for tracking the progress in the national exams. The y-axis is the
cumulative national exam pass rate after the the k-th national exam. Each
curve corresponds to a quartile group. As we can see from the left subplot,
younger groups had better cumulative pass rates from the 2nd national exams
after the provincial pass, and the monotonicity becomes very clear from the
3rd national exam. The differences among groups were substantial. After the
4th national exam, the youngest quartile group achieved a cumulative pass
rate of 16.7%, which was about twice as much as that of the 8.8% the oldest
quartile group. The difference further increased in later national exams. In
addition, the younger quartile groups kept making progress until much later—
the curve for the oldest quartile becomes flat after the 6th national exam, while
the curve for the youngest quartile does so only after the 9th or 10th national
exam.
Not surprisingly, as shown in the right subplot of Figure 2.1, the provincial
ranking is not as informative as the age at passing for predicting progresses in
national exams. The cumulative pass rates of the top three ranking quartiles
(Q4, Q3 and Q2) are monotonic according to the order of ranking— the highest
quartile has the highest pass rate after any number of exams. The lowest
ranked quartile (Q1) is the anomaly— it has higher cumulative pass rates
than those of the third highest quartile (Q2), and it performs particularly well
in the first five national exams after the provincial pass.25 Still, the provincial
ranking can serve as a proxy measure of ability with its limitations due to
repeated participations kept in mind.
I also divide provincial graduates into groups by age and provincial ranking.
In the left subplot of Figure 2.2, groups are defined jointly by age quartile and
whether provincial ranking was in the top 50%. The results confirm that age
is the primary dimension in predicting national exam success and the mono-
tonicity is observed in both dimensions. In the right subplot of Figure 2.2,
25One may suspect the reason is because individuals in the lowest quartile were younger.
However, the advantage of Q1 compared to Q2 in the cumulative pass rates after the 5th
national exam remains statistically significant at 5% even after controlling for age at passing
when analyzing using logistic regression. This advantage of Q1 compared to Q2 disappears
in later national exams— the statistical significance no long exists when passing after the
7th national exam is used as the independent variable in the logistic regression analysis.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative National Exam Pass Rate by Age Quartiles and by
Provincial Ranking Quartiles
Figure 2.2: Cumulative National Exam Pass Rate by Age and Provincial
Ranking
groups are defined jointly by provincial ranking quartile and whether age was
in the younger 50%. Age is again confirmed to be the dominant dimension as
younger groups outperformed older groups regardless of the provincial rank-
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ing. The two groups with the lowest ranking quartiles are the anomalies—
conditional on the age dimension, each of them outperformed some group
with better ranking. Specifically, among the four groups with older age, the
lowest provincial ranking quartile (Older, Q1) outperforms the second low-
est ranking quartile (Older, Q2). Among the four groups with younger age,
the lowest provincial ranking quartile (Younger, Q1) has the second highest
national exam pass rate. Except for these two groups, conditional on age,
groups with higher provincial exam ranking have higher national exam pass
rates. The anomalies, I conjecture, come from the fact that some candidates
in the lowest ranking quartile might have been constrained by their limited
access to scholarly resources before passing the provincial exam, and thus they
might benefit disproportionately from the equalization of access to educational
resources among provincial exam graduates.26
2.4.2 The Role of Family Resources in Exam Preparation
Age at passing the provincial exam and provincial ranking are outcomes shaped
by talent, educational investment starting in early childhood and exam success
at the prefectural level. It is reasonable to expect that family resources could
play a role in shaping these two proxy measures. In her study of Tongcheng
county in Anhui province, Beattie (1979) demonstrated how family wealth and
educational tradition contributed to sons’ exam success: while a son of a poor
family had to “bother about mundane matters like the family’s livelihood” a
son from a rich and educated family could “devote himself instead to unin-
terrupted study” and receive careful guidance and supervision from educated
family members (p.89-90). Ho (1962) also showed the additional challenges
that students from poor and uneducated families need to overcome. In the
case study of Tao Mo (1835-1902), Ho narrated (p.303),
Supported by his uncle [his adopted father], he began to study
at eight. Being poor, he early in life was accustomed to manual
work. His uncle wished him to concentrate on his studies but could
not afford tuition. Friends and relatives all urged his uncle to ap-
prentice him to a trade, but Tao Mo refused. He studied all the
26Using the subsample with family background information, I found that provincial grad-
uates in the group with the lowest ranking quartile and younger (Younger, Q1) actually had
more prestigious family background than the group with the second lowest ranking quartile
and younger age (Younger, Q2). For example, 13.1% of candidates in the group (Younger,
Q1) had fathers who held medium office, while this percentage for group (Younger, Q2) was
9.1%. Those for the other two groups, group (Younger, Q3) and group (Younger, Q4), were
15.1% and 16.5%.
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harder and did his best to help the family. Every morning he went
to the market place to sell silk fabrics woven by his mother and
brought home rice, salt, and daily necessaries. He studied in the
afternoon and at night, sharing the light with his mother, who con-
stantly wove. In 1865, at the age of twenty-one, he obtained his
shengyuan [Licentiate] degree. Not until then did he have a chance
to associate with local scholars and to improve his style of essay
writing.27
In the dataset, a provincial graduate’s family background is characterized by
the degree status and office holding of his father, grandfather and great grand-
father. Table 2.4 presents the distribution of fathers’ degree status by their
office holding. The results suggest that fathers’ degree status and their office
holding were highly correlated. Fathers who held higher offices also tended
to have higher degree status. In particular, among the 14 fathers who held
high offices, 13 of them (92.9%) also held provincial or national degrees, while
among fathers who held no degree, only 1.6% of them had provincial or na-
tional degrees.
Table 2.4: Distribution of Fathers’ Degree Status by Fathers’ Office Holding
Father’s
Office Holding
Father’s Degree Status Row Total
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None N. %
High
(above 3B)
13 0 1 0 14 0.8%
92.9% 0% 7.1% 0%
Medium
(7A-4A)
114 27 71 0 212 11.7%
53.8% 12.7% 33.5% 0%
Low
(below 7B)
34 102 46 64 246 13.6%
13.8% 41.5% 18.7% 26.0%
No Office 22 466 370 478 1336 73.9%
1.6% 34.9% 27.7% 35.8%
Column N. 183 595 488 542 1808
Column % 10.1% 32.9% 27.0% 30.0%
27Later, Tao Mo passed the provincial exam in 1867 at the age of 32 and then further
passed the national exam at the first attempt in 1868. Starting his official career as a
county magistrate, he gradually proved his integrity and capability and eventually rose to
the position of governor-general (rank 2A). While the life of Tao Mo provided a good example
of upward mobility from humble origins. It is clear that the disadvantages of limited family
resources likely prevented many others from climbing up the ladder of exams.
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Table 2.5: Distribution of Fathers’ Office Holding by Fathers’ Degree Status
Father’s
Degree
Status
Father’s Office Holding
High
(above 3B)
Medium
(7A-4A)
Low
(below 7B)
No Office
Prov./Nat. 7.1% 62.3% 18.6% 12.0%
Prefectural 0% 4.5% 17.1% 78.3%
Purchased 0.2% 14.5% 9.4% 75.8%
None 0% 0% 11.8% 88.2%
Table 2.5 presents the distribution of fathers’ office holding by their degree
statuses. It is worth noting that fathers who had purchased their prefectural
degree were 2.25 times more likely to hold medium or high offices than those
who had actually passed the prefectural exam. This is despite the fact that,
symbolically at least, the prefectural degree was superior to the purchased
degree. This was probably because fathers who purchased the jiansheng degree
had more resources (and perhaps also more willingness) to attain higher offices
through purchasing, than those who held the prefectural degrees via exam
success.
2.4.3 Provincial Graduates’ Prefectural Level Degree Types
It is useful to briefly discuss the different types of prefectural level degrees.
While all these degrees allowed their holders to participate the provincial exam,
they are informative about a provincial graduate’s path before his provincial
exam success. As will be shown, the type of prefectural level degree that a
provincial graduate held was significantly correlated with his age at passing. In
addition, one particular channel that family resources could contribute to sons’
younger successes in the provincial exam was through purchasing the jiansheng
degree to circumvent the intense competition at the prefectural level.
To compete in provincial exams, a candidate had to either earn the licenti-
ate degree by passing the licensing exam, or purchase the jiansheng degree,
which is the student status at the Imperial Academy. Tribute student status
(gongsheng) was the more advanced type of prefectural level degrees, which
awarded the qualification for holding public office. A licentiate could earn it
by passing additional special selections, some of which also had seniority re-
quirements.28 The tribute student status could also be bought. In the sample,
28There were five types of tribute student status. The bagong and yougong statuses were
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77.3% of provincial exam graduates had earned the licentiate degree, 10.1%
had also earned regular tribute status by merit. 8% were licentiates who had
purchased their tribute student status, finally 4.7% had purchased jiansheng
degree.
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 present the distribution of provincial graduates’ pre-
fectural level degrees by their fathers’ degree status and office holding, re-
spectively. The most noticeable pattern is that the proportion of candidates
holding the purchased jiansheng degree increases with father’s office’s promi-
nence. As shown in Table 2.7, among the 14 candidates whose fathers held
high offices, such as the top three officials in each province and vice ministers
and ministers in the central bureaucracy, 64.3% of them held the purchased
jiansheng degree. This percentage decreases with fathers’ office status. In
Table 2.6, among candidates whose fathers passed the provincial exam, 11%
purchased the jiansheng degree. This percentage is higher than in the other
three groups.
Table 2.6: Prefectural Level Degree Type by Fathers’ Degree Status
Father’s
Degree
Status
Provincial Graduates’ Prefectural Level Degree Row Total
Licentiate
Licentiate
then
Purchased
Purchased Tribute N. %
Prov./Nat. 110 26 19 18 173 10.3%
63.6% 15.0% 11.0% 10.4%
Prefectural 437 41 15 61 554 32.9%
78.9% 7.4% 2.7% 11.0%
Purchased 350 35 24 46 455 27.0%
76.9% 7.7% 5.3% 10.1%
None 406 32 21 45 504 29.9%
80.6% 6.3% 4.2% 8.9%
granted by special exams that were held every 12 years and 3 years respectively. Some
seniority requirement was required for participating the latter exams. Suigong and engong
were selected by seniority, and only licentiates who earned stipend (linsheng) were qualified
for selection. The last type is fugong status, awarded to those who failed in the provincial
exams but earned honorable mentions. Specifically, in each provincial exam, a secondary
list (fubang), whose quota was about 1/5 of the provincial quota, was prepared. So if the
provincial quota was 100, then candidates who ranked from 101 to 120 were awarded the
fugong status.
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Table 2.7: Prefectural Level Degree Type by Fathers’ Office Holding
Father’s
Office
Holding
Provincial Graduates’ Prefectural Level Degree Row Total
Licentiate
Licentiate
then
Purchased
Purchased Tribute N. %
High
(above 3B)
3 1 9 1 14 0.8%
21.4% 7.1% 64.3% 7.1%
Medium
(7A-4A)
119 29 26 23 197 11.7%
60.4% 14.7% 13.2% 11.7%
Low
(below 7B)
169 21 15 22 227 13.5%
74.4% 9.3% 6.6% 9.7%
No Office 1005 82 29 123 1239 73.9%
81.1% 6.6% 2.3% 9.9%
Lastly, it is worth noting that some cultural factors were also involved in the
decision about whether to purchase the jiansheng degree. As exam success
was culturally more respectable than purchase, in most cases, the purchase
was made only after some failed attempts in licensing exams.29 It is worth
noting that the percentage of jiansheng degree holders was about 100% higher
in the group whose fathers also held the purchased degree (5.3%) than in the
group whose fathers held the prefectural degree (2.7%). The reason could be
that candidates whose fathers held the purchased degree had more resources to
make the purchase, but it could also be because that those whose fathers held
the prefectural degrees via exam success valued more on passing the licensing
exam, and thus were more reluctant to circumvent it through purchase.
2.4.4 Family Background and the Two Proxy Measures of Abilities
To what extent were provincial graduates’ ages at passing and rankings as-
sociated with their family background? To answer this question, I start with
regression analysis focusing on the degree status and office holding of provin-
cial graduates’ fathers. Then I will extend the analysis to include backgrounds
29For example, the famous general-statesman Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) purchased his
jiansheng degree in 1832, at the age of 21, and then passed the Hunan provincial exam at
the same year. Although he started to participate the licensing exam at the young age of
14, the unfortunate subsequent death of his mother and father interrupted his progress in
exams since it was not allowed to participate exams during the mourning period. In 1832,
after the end of the mourning period for his father’s death, he raised 108 taels of silver to
purchase the jiansheng degree so that he need not to wait for additional years in licensing
exams (A Chronicle of Zuo Zongtang, compiled by Luo Zhengjun).
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of their grandfathers.
Family Background and Age at Passing
Table 2.8 presents the OLS estimates of regressions with the age at passing
as the dependent variable. In Column (1), the independent variables of in-
terest are the provincial graduates’ prefectural level degree types. Compared
to the base case of the licentiate degree without the tribute status, provin-
cial graduates who had purchased the jiansheng degree were about 2.9 years
younger. This is consistent with that the purchase could help circumvent the
intensive competition in licensing exams. Licentiates with purchased tribute
status, and regular tribute students were 5.9 years and 5.8 years older than li-
centiates without tribute status respectively. These results are not surprising,
because they probably would not have obtained the tribute status, no mat-
ter whether via purchase or by merit, if they had passed the provincial exam
much sooner. Given the provincial degree was clearly superior to the tribute
student status, most candidates made the purchases only after repeated fail-
ures in provincial exams. Tribute student status though special selection was
also usually obtained after repeated failures in the provincial exam, since the
special selections took time and seniority requirements were often applied.
Column (2) shows that provincial graduates whose fathers held provincial or
national degrees were about 2.7 years younger compared to those whose fathers
did not. In fact, sons of fathers with no degree were about as old as sons with
fathers who had either earned a licentiate degree or purchased a jiansheng
degree. As shown in Column (3), this result remains significant at 1% after
controlling for the prefectural level degree types. It is worth noting that the
coefficients for prefectural level degrees in Column (3) are similar to those in
Column (1).
Column (4) shows that provincial graduates whose fathers held offices passed
at younger ages than those whose fathers held no degree. Moreover, the higher
offices held by their fathers, the younger the candidates when they passed the
provincial exam. Specifically, provincial graduates whose fathers held low of-
fices, which refer to posts lower than the rank of a county magistrate (7A), were
about 1.7 years younger than those whose fathers held no offices. Provincial
graduates whose fathers held medium offices, ranging from the rank of a county
magistrate (7A) to the rank of a prefect (4A), were about 2.4 years younger.
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Table 2.8: Fathers’ Background and Ages at Passing the Provincial Exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age Age Age Age Age Age Age
Father’s Degree Status:
Purchased -0.491 -0.632 -0.217 -0.366
(0.562) (0.541) (0.574) (0.553)
Prefectural -0.463 -0.674 -0.277 -0.491
(0.535) (0.514) (0.538) (0.518)
Provincial/National -2.673*** -3.075*** -0.899 -1.408
(0.765) (0.742) (0.963) (0.930)
Father’s Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) -1.740*** -1.767*** -1.633** -1.594***
(0.629) (0.607) (0.640) (0.618)
Medium (7A to 4A) -2.437*** -2.809*** -2.015** -2.148***
(0.665) (0.653) (0.826) (0.809)
High (above 3B) -6.628*** -5.604** -5.955** -4.497*
(2.322) (2.320) (2.459) (2.462)
Prefectural-level Degree Type:
Licentiate with purchase 5.890*** 6.196*** 6.257*** 6.303***
(0.766) (0.766) (0.768) (0.769)
Purchased -2.923*** -2.515*** -1.563 -1.691*
(0.971) (0.974) (1.015) (1.019)
Tribute 5.802*** 5.874*** 5.910*** 5.919***
(0.686) (0.684) (0.684) (0.685)
Subregion:
Jiangsu -1.375*** -1.416*** -1.315*** -1.398*** -1.289*** -1.385*** -1.269***
(0.421) (0.436) (0.419) (0.436) (0.420) (0.436) (0.420)
Constant 33.84*** 34.50*** 34.39*** 34.52*** 34.25*** 34.67*** 34.50***
(0.838) (0.918) (0.884) (0.867) (0.836) (0.916) (0.883)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1686 1686 1686 1677 1677 1677 1677
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.024 0.098 0.032 0.103 0.030 0.103
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Larger age percentile corresponds to older age: 0 is the youngest in the cohort, and 1 is the oldest.
Base Cases for dummy variables: The base case for father’s degree status dummy is “None”.
The base case for prefectural-level degree dummy is “Licentiate”. The base case for subregion dummy is “Anhui”.
The difference is especially large for the 14 provincial gradates (0.8 percent of
the sample) who had high official fathers. They were 6.6 years younger than
their peers whose fathers held no offices. In Column (5), the prefectural level
degree types are included. Interestingly, the coefficient of purchased jiansheng
dummy in Column (5) is not statistically significant any more, and it becomes
60
smaller in absolute value compared to that in Column (1). At the same time,
the coefficient for having a high official father decreases in absolute value,
and becomes less statistically significant. In fact, these results are consistent
with the previously discussed fact that provincial graduates whose fathers held
higher offices were more likely to purchase their degrees. The percentage of
purchased degrees (64.3%) was much higher than that in other groups. These
results suggest that the younger ages at passing that the sons of high officials
achieved could be partially attributed to the purchases of jiansheng degrees.
When both father’s degree status and office holding are included in the regres-
sion, the father’s office holding is the key variable for explaining the ages at
passing, as shown in Column (6). Compared to Column (2), the coefficient for
the indicator of fathers passing the provincial exam becomes not statistically
significant and its absolute value decreases substantially after controlling for
fathers’ office holding in Column (6). However, the coefficients for fathers’
office holding dummies remain relatively stable after controlling for fathers’
degree status. In Column (7), after further controlling for prefectural level
degree type, the coefficient for the indicator of fathers holding the high offices
becomes less significant, but the coefficients for fathers holding low offices and
medium offices remain robust. All these results are consistent with the argu-
ment that better family resources helped candidates pass the provincial exam
younger. In particular, fathers’ office holding mattered more than fathers’
degree status.
It is helpful to also examine the distributions of ages of passing the provin-
cial exam in different family background groups. Table 2.9 and Table 2.10
present the distribution of ages by fathers’ degree status and office holding re-
spectively. It can be seen clearly that prestigious groups were overrepresented
in the younger deciles (esp. in the youngest decile). For example, among
provincial graduates whose fathers held provincial or national degrees, 16.8%
of them passed among the youngest 10% in their cohorts, which corresponds
to an overrepresentation of 68 percent.30 Among those whose fathers held high
offices, 35.7% of them belonged to the youngest decile, and the percentage for
those whose fathers held medium offices was 18.8%.
30The benchmark for measuring the level of overrepresentation is 10%, since by definition,
there should be 10% observations belonging to the youngest decile in the sample.
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Table 2.9: Distribution of Ages at Passing the Provincial Exam by Father’s
Degree Status
Age Decile Distribution of Ages by Father’s Degree Status
Prov./Nat. Prefectural Purchased None
1 (Youngest) 16.8% 11.2% 9.6% 9.3%
2 13.6% 9.7% 11.7% 9.0%
3 12.5% 11.9% 9.2% 6.5%
4 8.7% 8.2% 12.7% 12.2%
5 8.2% 8.7% 8.2% 9.9%
6 10.9% 11.2% 10.8% 10.2%
7 4.3% 9.7% 7.6% 11.0%
8 9.8% 10.2% 10.2% 12.0%
9 8.7% 9.4% 9.8% 10.4%
10 (Oldest) 6.5% 9.7% 10.2% 9.5%
Column N. 184 597 489 557
Column % 10.1% 32.7% 26.8% 30.5%
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Table 2.10: Distribution of Ages at Passing the Provincial Exam by Father’s
Office Holding
Age Decile
Distribution of Ages by Father’s Office Holding
High
(above 3B)
Medium
(7A-4A)
Low
(below 7B)
No Office
1 (Youngest) 35.7% 18.8% 11.8% 8.9%
2 7.1% 11.7% 11.4% 10.1%
3 0.0% 13.1% 13.0% 8.3%
4 14.3% 6.6% 11.0% 11.3%
5 14.3% 7.5% 10.6% 8.8%
6 21.4% 9.4% 8.1% 11.5%
7 0.0% 7.5% 7.3% 9.7%
8 7.1% 8.5% 10.2% 11.0%
9 0.0% 9.9% 10.6% 9.8%
10 (Oldest) 0.0% 7.0% 6.1% 10.6%
Column N. 14 213 246 1343
Column % 0.8% 11.7% 13.5% 74.0%
Lastly, I perform some multigenerational analysis, to examine how much the
background of a provincial graduate’s grandfather was associated his age at
passing. Table 2.11 presents the OLS estimates. The results suggest that
provincial graduates whose grandfathers held provincial or national degrees
passed the provincial exam at young ages (Column 1). That result is robust to
including their fathers’ degree status (Column 2). While provincial graduates
whose grandfathers held medium offices also passed at young ages (Column 3),
the result is not robust to controlling for fathers’ office holding (Column 4).
These results are consistent with the finding in Chapter 1 that grandfathers’
degree status mattered for their grandsons’ exam success even after controlling
for the fathers’. In addition, these results lead to a conjecture that the family
tradition in educational investment and exam success could lead to a more
persistent advantage in the exam system than the family’s office holding.
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Table 2.11: Grandfathers’ Background and Ages at Passing the Provincial
Exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Age Age Age
Grandfather’s Degree Status:
Purchased -0.740 -0.517
(0.495) (0.519)
Prefectural -0.236 0.222
(0.529) (0.565)
Provincial/National -2.473*** -1.639*
(0.890) (0.926)
Grandfather’s Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) -0.738 -0.387
(0.713) (0.716)
Medium (7A to 4A) -1.450** -0.718
(0.670) (0.685)
High (above 3B) -4.296 -2.105
(2.979) (3.021)
Father’s Degree Status:
Purchased -0.458
(0.567)
Prefectural -0.573
(0.552)
Provincial/National -2.853***
(0.786)
Father’s Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) -1.661***
(0.616)
Medium (7A to 4A) -2.801***
(0.676)
High (above 3B) -5.180**
(2.361)
Prefectural-level Degree Type:
Licentiate with purchase 6.089*** 6.325*** 6.022*** 6.329***
(0.769) (0.769) (0.767) (0.769)
Purchased -2.707*** -2.380** -2.751*** -1.563
(0.975) (0.977) (0.986) (1.028)
Tribute 5.922*** 5.952*** 5.788*** 5.880***
Sub-region: Jiangsu -1.298*** -1.236*** -1.331*** -1.265***
(0.422) (0.421) (0.422) (0.422)
Constant 34.19*** 34.39*** 34.14*** 34.38***
(0.877) (0.900) (0.844) (0.841)
Observations 1684 1682 1680 1670
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.101 0.091 0.102
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
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Family Background and Provincial Ranking
Table 2.12 presents the OLS estimates for regressions with the provincial rank-
ing percentile as the dependent variable. Column (1) suggests that provincial
graduates whose fathers held provincial or national degrees ranked 7.2 per-
centiles higher than those whose fathers held no degree.31 Column (2) sug-
gests that provincial graduates whose fathers held medium and high offices
ranked 4.6 and 26.3 percentiles higher than those whose fathers held no de-
gree. In Column (3), when both fathers’ degree status and office holding are
included, only the coefficient for provincial graduates whose fathers held high
offices remains significant. This coefficient represents a large advantage: they
ranked 23.7 percentiles higher than those whose fathers held no degree. Over-
all, provincial graduates with more prestigious family background passed the
provincial exam with higher ranking.
In the above analysis, I showed that the two proxy measures of candidates’
competence at the provincial exam, age at pass and provincial ranking, were
associated with their family background— those from more prestigious families
passed younger and with better rankings. I interpret these results as evidence
that their family resources contributed to their provincial exam success. In
Chapter 1, I estimated the probabilities of passing the provincial exam condi-
tional on fathers’ degree status: sons of provincial or national graduates were
about eight times more likely to pass the provincial exam than those whose
fathers held prefectural level degree or the purchased degrees, who, in turn,
were about eight times more likely to pass the provincial exam than classically
educated candidates whose fathers held no degrees.32 Results in this Chapter
complement these findings: candidates from more prestigious families not only
had higher chances of passing the provincial exam, but conditional on passing,
passed at younger ages with better ranking.
31This means that if there are 100 candidates who passed in a provincial exam, the
average ranking for those whose fathers held provincial or national degrees is ranked 7.2
higher than that of those whose fathers held no degree.
32In addition, stratification did not only take place across different groups defined by
fathers’ degree status, but also existed within each group, where a small subgroup of indi-
viduals enjoyed substantially higher chance of success than the group’s overall level.
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Table 2.12: Fathers’ Background and Provincial Ranking
(1) (2) (3)
Ranking pctl. Ranking pctl. Ranking pctl.
Father’s Degree Status:
Purchased 0.00415 -0.00286
(0.0186) (0.0190)
Prefectural 0.0244 0.0183
(0.0177) (0.0178)
Provincial/National 0.0719*** 0.0315
(0.0255) (0.0320)
Father’s Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) 0.0248 0.0194
(0.0209) (0.0213)
Medium (7A to 4A) 0.0458** 0.0331
(0.0225) (0.0279)
High (above 3B) 0.263*** 0.237***
(0.0799) (0.0848)
Prefectural-level Degree Type
Licentiate with purchase -0.000482 -0.00338 -0.00439
(0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0265)
Purchased 0.0162 -0.0195 -0.0155
(0.0335) (0.0350) (0.0351)
Tribute 0.0103 0.00966 0.00929
(0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0236)
Subregion:
Jiangsu 0.0683*** 0.0703*** 0.0696***
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145)
Constant 0.448*** 0.453*** 0.448***
(0.0305) (0.0288) (0.0304)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1688 1679 1679
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.014 0.014
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Larger ranking percentile corresponds to better ranking: 0 is the lowest ranked in the cohort,
and 1 is the highest ranked.
Base cases for dummy variables: The base case for father’s degree status dummy is “None”.
The base case for prefectural-level degree dummy is “Licentiate”. The base case for subregion
dummy is “Anhui”.
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2.4.5 Family Background and the National Exam Success
There were two different stages at which family resources could contribute to
a provincial graduate’s success in the national exam: (1) before the provincial
exam success, a candidate from a wealthy and educated family could benefit
from uninterrupted study, better education, and more guidance from educated
family members, (2) after passing the provincial exam, better family resources
could help further education in private academies and fund the cost for partic-
ipating in the national exam including the long-distance trip from Jiangnan to
Beijing, where national exams took place. Advantages originated from family
background in the former stage could at least be partially captured by the two
proxy measures of competence.
It is important to note that inequalities of opportunity were substantially
alleviated in the competition for national exams relative to the provincial
exams. Indeed, provincial graduates were well funded and assisted by the
government in their participation in the national exam.33 The privilege of
traveling and lodging in the national postal network was granted for their trips
to Beijing to sit in the national exams. In addition, their hard earned success
in the provincial exam led to a “sudden categorical elevation” in social status
(Ho, 1962, p.27), which should have substantially alleviated difficulties and
constraints faced by those came from humble family background. Perhaps even
more importantly, provincial graduates were mature scholars, whose mastering
of the exam curriculum and techniques was already proved by their provincial
exam success. The superior educational opportunities enjoyed by those from
families with well-established traditions in classical literacy and exam success
became less important than in earlier stages.
What empirical patterns shall we expect if the competition in the national
exam was meritocratic and inequality of opportunity was effectively eliminated
after passing the provincial exam? In this ideal scenario, the national exam
outcome should be independent of family background, after controlling for the
measures of competence at the provincial exam, such as ages of passing the
provincial exam and the provincial ranking. In other words, family resources
mattered only in the stage before provincial exam success, and the contribution
33As regulated in by Imperially Prescribed Guidelines for the Civil Examination Grounds
(Qinding Kechang Tiaoli), stipends were provided to provincial graduates to participate
the national exam in Beijing, according to the distance of traveling (Mao, 2009, p.10). In
addition, local governments and lineages provided financial support. Mao (2009) provides a
comprehensive study on this topic.
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of family resources were fully captured by the measures of competence at the
provincial exam. In the following analysis, I will test this benchmark.
I start the analysis by using fathers’ degree status and office holding as the
measure of family background. Table 2.13 presents the estimates of logistic
regressions where the dependent variable is whether a provincial graduate ever
passed the national exam. Column (1) is the baseline specification where the
two proxy measures of competence are the only independent variables of in-
terest. The regression result confirms that those who passed the provincial
exam at older ages were less likely to pass the national exam, while a higher
provincial ranking was associated with a higher chance of success. Evaluated
at the mean of the data, the predicted probability of passing the national
exam increases by about 1 percentage point as the age at passing the provin-
cial exam decreases by one year.34 In Column (2), the father’s degree status
is included as independent variables without controlling for the two proxy
measures of competence. Those candidates whose fathers held provincial or
national degrees had higher chances of passing the national exam. Evaluated
as the mean, the predicted probability for a provincial graduate whose father
held the provincial or national degrees is 27.6%, while that for a provincial
graduate whose father held no degree is 19.8%. This corresponds to a sizable
advantage of 7.8 percentage points.35 In Column (3), after controlling for the
two proxy measures of competence, the dummy for those whose fathers held
the provincial or national degrees becomes statistically insignificant, and its
coefficient becomes smaller.
34The marginal effect of age is approximately linear around the mean age. The predicted
probability of passing the national exams evaluated at the average age of the sample (33.84
years old) is 18.7%, and when evaluated at an age that is three years younger than the
mean (30.84 years old) the predicted probability increases to 21.6%, an increase of about 3
percentage points.
35If we further control for the prefectural level degrees, while the coefficient for having
fathers who held provincial or national degrees remains significant at 5%, their advantage
in predicted probability of passing the national exam becomes smaller. Evaluated at means,
their predicted probability is 23.8%, and that for those had fathers held no degree is 20.4%.
The difference is 3.4 percentage points. This smaller effect is mainly because a substantial
part of the higher chance of passing the national exam was explained by the difference in
the prefectural level degree composition. Specifically, tribute students by merit had higher
chances of passing the national exam, which is significant at 1% and corresponds to a
predicted probability that is 8.6 percentage points higher than those who had licentiate
degrees. In addition, the difference between purchased jiansheng and licentiates is 4.8 per-
centage points, although the coefficient is not significant. As shown in Table 2.6, provincial
graduates whose fathers held provincial or national degrees had higher proportions holding
these two types of prefectural level degrees.
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Table 2.13: Father’s Background and National Exam Success
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Pass_nat Pass_nat Pass_nat Pass_nat Pass_nat
Age -0.0602*** -0.0594*** -0.0597***
(0.00794) (0.00797) (0.00799)
Prov. ranking pctl. 0.452** 0.429** 0.444**
(0.213) (0.214) (0.214)
Father’s Degree Status:
Purchased -0.00219 -0.0452
(0.158) (0.161)
Prefectural -0.107 -0.164
(0.153) (0.156)
Provincial/National 0.439** 0.266
(0.200) (0.206)
Father’s Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) -0.00637 -0.104
(0.178) (0.181)
Medium (7A to 4A) 0.317* 0.159
(0.177) (0.183)
High (above 3B) 0.510 0.0303
(0.601) (0.619)
Sub-region:
Jiangsu -0.196 -0.106 -0.202 -0.0949 -0.191
(0.125) (0.122) (0.125) (0.121) (0.125)
Constant 0.531 -1.215*** 0.561 -1.258*** 0.511
(0.364) (0.257) (0.378) (0.244) (0.368)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1808 1808 1808 1808 1808
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.012 0.048 0.010 0.046
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Larger ranking percentile corresponds to better ranking: 0 is the lowest ranked in the cohort, and 1 is the
highest ranked.
Base cases for dummy variables: The base case for father’s office holding dummy is “None”. The base case
for prefectural-level degree dummy is “Licentiate”. The base case for sub-region dummy is “Anhui”.
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In Column (4), father’s office holding is included as independent variables
without controlling for the two proxy measures of competence. The coeffi-
cient for having fathers who held medium office is significant at 10%, while
other dummies are not. Evaluated at the mean, the medium office effect cor-
responds to 5.4 percentage points higher probability of passing the national
exam compared to those whose fathers held no degree. It becomes statistically
insignificant after further controlling for the two proxy measures of competence
in Column (5). In addition, the coefficients for all three father’s office holding
dummies decrease compared to Column (4).
These results are consistent with the empirical implication of the benchmark
scenario of meritocratic competition with inequality of opportunity effectively
eliminated after the provincial exam. While these results lend confidence to
the benchmark hypothesis, it is important to notice that using only the fathers’
background could have underestimated the impact of family background. As
suggested by findings in Chapter 1, grandfathers could have influence on the
grandsons’ exam success, conditional on the fathers’ status. Some provincial
graduates whose fathers held no degree or office might have well-established
uncles. In fact, historical studies have found that lineage resources also mat-
tered: elite families and lineages in late Imperial China adopted a variety of
strategies to preserve their success, such as creating lineage endowment land
for sponsoring exam preparation and degree purchases, and establishing the
norm of routine contribution to lineage funds from their office holding members
(Beattie, 1979; Zhang, 2010a; Chang, 1955).
Measuring Family Background Using Ancestors’ Highest Degree or
Office Holding
To further test the benchmark hypothesis, I use the highest degree (or of-
fice) held by any of the father, grandfather, or great grandfather (henceforth
family degree and family office) as the measure of family background. Com-
pared to only using the father’s background, this new measure captures more
information about the lineage and may well be a better measure of family back-
ground. Grandfather and great grandfather’s background likely contributed
to the provincial graduate’s success through their impact on family resources.
Grandfather and great grandfather’ background are also informative about the
background of the provincial graduate’s other relatives, such as uncles.
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Table 2.14 presents the estimates of logistic regressions where the dependent
variable is whether a provincial graduate ever passed the national exam, and
family degree and office are used as measures of family background. It is help-
ful to compare the results with results in Table 2.13. First, when age and
provincial ranking are not controlled for, Column (1) and Column (3) suggest
family degree and office are more important than father’s degree or office (cf
Table 2.13 Column 2 and 4). Second, after controlling for the age and provin-
cial ranking, in Column (2), the coefficient for having ancestors’ best degree
be provincial or higher remains significant at 5%. In Column (4), the coeffi-
cient for having ancestors’ best office being medium office remains significant
at 1% and the coefficient for having ancestors who held high office is signifi-
cant at 10%. While these coefficients become smaller after controlling for age
and provincial ranking, they still represent sizable effect. In Column (2), the
predicted probability of passing the national exam for provincial graduates
who had ancestors with provincial or national degrees is 25.6%, while that for
provincial graduates with no degree holding ancestors is 18.8%. This corre-
sponds to a 36.2% higher chance. In Column (4), the predicted probabilities
for those whose ancestors held medium and high office are 24.7% and 30.6%,
while predicted probabilities for those whose ancestors held low and no office
are 17.8% and 18.4%. The predicated probabilities for those whose ancestors
held medium and high office are 34.2% and 66.3% higher than those whose
ancestors held no office.
In fact, if we compare results in Table 2.13 and Table 2.14, when family degree
and office are used to measure family background, coefficients for indicators
of provincial/national degree and medium and high offices become larger and
more statistically significant. Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 present the cumulative
national exam pass rate by ancestors’ degree and office holding. In each figure,
groups in the left subplot are defined by the father’s status, and groups in the
right subplot are defined by the highest status achieved by the three ancestors.
Consistent with results in the regression analysis, when the ancestors’ highest
status is used as the family background measure, the difference between the
humblest group and the most prestigious groups is more pronounced. Indeed,
results from this comparison are consistent with the view of Hymes (1986) in
his critique to the social mobility thesis of Ho (1962). Hymes argued that a
broader definition of family that goes beyond the direct patrilineal ancestors
to include agnatic or affine relations is necessary in the Chinese context and
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Table 2.14: Ancestors’ Highest Degree and Office Holding and National
Exam Success
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Logit Logit
Pass_nat Pass_nat Pass_nat Pass_nat
Age -0.0586*** -0.0573***
(0.00794) (0.00795)
Prov. ranking pctl. 0.431** 0.399*
(0.214) (0.214)
Ancestors’ Highest Degree:
Purchased 0.0597 0.0253
(0.200) (0.204)
Prefectural 0.00806 -0.0102
(0.186) (0.189)
Provincial/National 0.535** 0.417**
(0.208) (0.213)
Ancestors’ Highest Office:
Low (below 7B) -0.00994 -0.0409
(0.172) (0.175)
Medium (7A to 4A) 0.494*** 0.394***
(0.140) (0.144)
High (above 3B) 1.027*** 0.704*
(0.380) (0.390)
Sub-region:
Jiangsu -0.131 -0.224* -0.120 -0.208*
(0.122) (0.126) (0.122) (0.126)
Constant -1.314*** 0.425 -1.399*** 0.325
(0.285) (0.399) (0.250) (0.372)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1808 1808 1808 1808
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.050 0.018 0.051
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Larger ranking percentile corresponds to better ranking: 0 is the lowest ranked in the cohort,
and 1 is the highest ranked.
Base cases for dummy variables: The base case for ancestors’ degree or highest office holding
is “None”. The base case for sub-region dummy is “Anhui”.
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that it leads to lower measures of social mobility.
Figure 2.3: Cumulative National Exam Pass Rate by Ancestors’ Degree
Status
Figure 2.4: Cumulative National Exam Pass Rate by Ancestors’ Office
Holding
These results suggest that once we use a more informative measure of family
background, the benchmark hypothesis, which assumes a meritocratic compe-
tition with inequality of opportunity effectively eliminated after the provincial
exam, is no longer supported by the data. There are several possible expla-
nations. First, provincial graduates with more prestigious family background
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might have advantages that are not fully captured by the two proxy measures
at provincial exam. Second, even though provincial graduates were generously
supported by the state and local communities, those from prestigious fami-
lies might still benefit from more abundant resources. In other words, even if
provincial exam success substantially alleviated inequality of opportunities it
did not eliminate it.
2.5 Family Background and the Official Career Attainment
In this section, I study to what extent provincial graduates’ family background
played a role in their official career attainment. Out of the 14 provincial
exam alumni directories that were used in the previous analysis, I construct a
subsample of 1125 provincial graduates from the nine alumni directories that
were compiled more than 20 years after the provincial exam so that the office
holding statuses recorded in these directories were close to their final official
career attainment. As discussed in the historical review section, official posts
were ordered into a nine-rank system, including 1 to 9 primary ranks each
divided into two sub-ranks, A and B. Together with the lowest unranked posts,
there are 19 sub-ranks. In my analysis, I encode official career attainment
increases from 0 to 19, where 0 denotes not holding any office, 1 denotes the
lowly unranked posts, and 2 to 19 denote the 18 sub-ranks from 9B to the
highest 1A.
Table 2.15 presents the distribution of office ranks by whether they passed the
national exam. For provincial graduates who did not pass the national exam,
the majority of them held no office (57.7%), and only 18.9% of them obtained
medium or high office. National graduates had much better career attainment:
86.2% of them held medium or high office, and 35.7% of them reached the rank
of 5B or above which required some promotion, given that initial placement
mostly ranked from 7A to 6A.
Table 2.16 presents the results of regression analysis on father’s background
and career attainment. In the left three columns, the dependent variable is the
official ranks encoded in the scale of 0 to 19. Coefficients in these regressions
have intuitive interpretation as 1 unit corresponds to one sub-rank.
The coefficients of age at passing the provincial exam, provincial ranking, and
whether the provincial graduate further passed the national exam (Pass_nat)
are stable across the three specifications. The benefit of passing the national
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Table 2.15: Career Attainment by National Exam Success
Office Levels
Provincial Graduates
(Not passed the
national exam)
National Graduates Overall
N. % N. % N. %
High
(above 3B)
4 0.4% 8 3.6% 12 1.1%
Medium
(5B-4A)
45 5.0% 72 32.1% 117 10.4%
Medium
(7A-6A)
122 13.5% 113 50.4% 235 20.9%
Low
(below 7B)
210 23.3% 5 2.2% 215 19.1%
None 520 57.7% 26 11.6% 546 48.5%
Total 901 100% 224 100% 1,125 100%
exam was substantial: national graduates had a career advancement five sub-
ranks higher than average, which was equivalent to a promotion from a minor
clerk of rank 9B to county magistrate ranked 7A. This is consistent with the
fact that those who passed the national exam were almost guaranteed an initial
placement equivalent to the rank of county magistrate while those held only
the provincial degree had to start with much lower appointments.
Younger ages at passing the provincial exam and higher provincial rankings
help a candidate achieve a better office even after controlling for the national
exam pass. However, these coefficients imply small effects. Specifically, Col-
umn (3) suggests that being 10 years younger at passing the provincial exam
only translates to an increase of 1.2 sub-rank, and moving from the bottom to
the top in provincial ranking only translates to an increase of 0.76 sub-rank.
The fact that better provincial ranking was associated with a more successful
official career after controlling for the national exam success deserves some dis-
cussion. Despite the small magnitude, it suggests that ranking produced by the
provincial exams was meaningfully related to official careers. On one hand,
we know that the bureaucratic recruitment explicitly utilized the provincial
ranking. In Ministry of Civil Service’s routine selection (jianxuan) for provin-
cial graduates who failed repeatedly in the national exam, provincial ranking
was used to determine the order of the waiting list— those who passed with
better ranking were granted higherpriority in their cohort (Ma, 2010). On the
other hand, better provincial ranking could be associated with higher human
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Table 2.16: Father’s Background and Career Attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Office rank Office rank Office rank 7A or above 5B or above
OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Age -0.0662*** -0.0590*** -0.0600*** -0.0496*** -0.0628***
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0153)
Prov. ranking pctl. 0.890*** 0.738** 0.762** 0.394 0.924**
(0.344) (0.341) (0.341) (0.300) (0.403)
Pass_nat 5.348*** 5.357*** 5.376*** 3.963*** 2.456***
(0.250) (0.247) (0.247) (0.279) (0.236)
Father’s Degree Status:
Purchased 0.721*** 0.540** 0.165 0.265
(0.261) (0.262) (0.228) (0.321)
Prefectural 0.300 0.178 0.0286 0.210
(0.246) (0.245) (0.220) (0.307)
Prov./Nat. 0.915** -0.458 -0.549 -0.0339
(0.361) (0.454) (0.401) (0.480)
Father’s Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) 0.827*** 0.913*** 0.525** 0.734**
(0.295) (0.301) (0.246) (0.320)
Medium (7A to 4A) 1.210*** 1.479*** 0.874*** 1.151***
(0.316) (0.393) (0.315) (0.386)
High (above 3B) 3.945*** 4.520*** 2.101*** 2.517***
(0.951) (1.020) (0.755) (0.818)
Sub-region:
Jiangsu -0.0956 -0.137 -0.143 -0.176 -0.413*
(0.203) (0.201) (0.201) (0.174) (0.226)
Constant 1.348** 1.309** 1.117** -3.156*** -2.979***
(0.568) (0.549) (0.564) (0.590) (0.749)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.406 0.418 0.421 0.364 0.301
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Larger ranking percentile corresponds to better ranking: 0 is the lowest ranked in the cohort, and 1 is the
highest ranked.
Base cases for dummy variables: The base case for father’s office holding dummy is “None”. The base case for
prefectural-level degree dummy is “Licentiate”. The base case for sub-region dummy is “Anhui”.
capital that was not fully captured by the national exam success. I tested the
hypothesis that the association between higher provincial ranking and more
successful career was mainly driven by those who failed the national exam.
This hypothesis is motivated by the fact that among those who failed the na-
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tional exam, those with better provincial rankings were favored by the routine
selection. However, this hypothesis is not supported by data— the interaction
term is positive though it is not significant at 10%.
Let us now examine the coefficients of dummies indicating father’s background.
Estimates in Column (1) suggest that provincial graduates whose whose fathers
held a purchased degree or provincial/national degrees attained higher offices
than those whose father were licentiates or held no degree. Column (2) suggest
that fathers’ office was monotonically associated with more successful career
attainment. In Column (3), both fathers’ degree status and office holding
are included, and only the coefficient for fathers’ purchased degree dummy
remains statistically significant. These results suggest that fathers’ resources
and political connections contributed to the sons’ official career advancement,
thus casting doubts on the pure meritocracy of the Chinese civil service. It
is important to note that the coefficients represent sizable effects. In Column
(3), the coefficient for fathers’ medium office implies achieving an office 1.5
sub-ranks higher than the average, and that for fathers’ high office implies a
4.5 sub-rank advantage, while the average official rank obtained in the sample
is 3.8. In other words, compared to those whose fathers held no office, the
advantage associated with having a father holding the medium office was about
40% of the average career attainment. The advantage associated with having
a father holding high office was about 84% of the “benefit” of the gain from
passing the national exam.
Column (4) shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent
variable takes on the value 1 if the provincial graduate obtained an office
equal to or higher than the rank of county magistrate (7A) and zero otherwise.
The reason for choosing rank 7A as the cutoff is because offices ranked 7A or
higher had considerable responsibility, power and importance, and are also
classified by Ho (1962) as the middle and upper strata of the bureaucracy.
The results show that provincial graduates whose fathers held higher offices
had statistically higher chances in obtaining offices above 7A. Conditional on
passing the national exam, the predicted probabilities of achieving rank 7A or
above for those whose fathers held low, medium and high offices are 87.9%,
90.4%, and 96.4% respectively. The predicted probability for those whose
father held no office is 82.9%. The advantages associated with fathers’ higher
offices were more pronounced when provincial graduates failed to pass the
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national exam. Conditional on not passing the national exam, the predicted
probability for obtaining an office higher than 7A for those whose fathers held
no degree is 16.5%, while the probabilities for those whose fathers held low,
medium and high offices are 24.0%, 29.9% and 53.9% respectively. These
correspond to 45.5%, 81.4% and 226.9% higher chances compared to the those
whose fathers held no degree.
While a national graduate could obtain an initial placement mostly ranked
from 7A to 6A, to obtain the rank of 5B or above, some promotions were
required. Thus it is meaningful to examine to what extent a provincial grad-
uate’s family background could contribute to obtaining an office ranked 5B
or higher. This analysis can inform us about the role that family background
played in career advancement beyond the entry level. In Column (5), a lo-
gistic regression model is estimated where the dependent variable is whether
the provincial graduate obtained an office ranked 5B or above. In the sample,
only 11.5% of provincial graduates succeeded in reaching such career success.
Again, the results show that fathers’ higher office holding was statistically sig-
nificantly associated with higher chances of success. Conditional on passing
the national exam, the predicted probability of success for individuals whose
fathers held no offices is 27.2%, while that for those whose fathers held low,
medium and high offices are 40.4%, 48.7% and 73.9% respectively. This repre-
sents a much larger advantage associated with fathers’ office holding compared
to that associated with obtaining an office ranked 7A or above. In other words,
while passing the national exam equalized the chances of getting a decent entry
level appointment, those whose fathers held higher offices enjoyed substantial
advantages in making further career advancement. Conditional on not passing
the national exam, the predicted probability for those whose fathers held no
offices is 4.0%, and that for those whose fathers held low, medium and high
offices are 7.6%, 10.8%, and 28.2% respectively. These correspond to 91.6%,
170.1% and 606.8% higher chances compared to those whose fathers held no
degree. Again, these represent a larger difference compared to that in ob-
taining an office ranked 7A or above. Figure 2.5 summarizes the predicted
probabilities of official career attainment conditional on fathers’ office holding
and national exam success.
Lastly, I also conducted a regression analysis about career attainment using
the alternative measure of family background using the three direct patrilineal
78
Figure 2.5: Predicted Probabilities of Official Career Attainment Conditional
on Fathers’ Office Holding and National Exam Success
ancestors’ highest degree and office holding. The results are presented in Table
B.2 in Appendix B. While the main results in Table 2.16 remain robust un-
der the alternative measures, it is worth noting that coefficients for indicators
of ancestors’ office holding are slightly smaller than those in the counterpart
specifications where the father’s office holding is used. In other words, using
ancestors’ highest office holding does not lead to more significant association
between family background and career attainment. This contrasts with what
we observed in analyzing the family background and national exam success.
My conjecture is that ancestors’ degree and office holding better captures lin-
eage and family tradition in educational investment and exam participation,
which helped exam success, but when it comes to career attainment, the fa-
ther’s political connection played a more crucial role.
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2.6 Conclusion
While success in the Imperial Civil Service Examination system offered a va-
riety of social privileges, the most significant and desirable reward was always
a successful official career. Unlike the anonymously graded written exams,
which, to a large extent, were impartially evaluated, bureaucratic appointment
depended on family resources and connections. I constructed an individual-
level dataset from primary sources that tracks provincial graduates’ further
progress in national exams and official career attainment more than 20 years
after their provincial exam victory. I use this dataset to measure the role
of family background in provincial graduates’ attainment both in the exam
system and in the imperial bureaucracy.
First, I find that provincial graduates with more prestigious family background
passed the provincial exam younger and with higher ranks. Specifically, OLS
estimates suggest that those whose fathers held low, medium and high offices
passed the provincial exam 1.6, 2.0 and 6.0 years younger than those whose
fathers held no office.36 Those whose fathers had passed the provincial exam
also passed at a younger age (about 2.7 years), compared to those whose fa-
thers held no degree, although the effect is not statistically significant after
controlling for fathers’ office holding. One specific mechanism underlying the
younger ages associated with more prestigious family background was the more
frequent purchase of the jiansheng degree, which granted the privilege to par-
ticipate in the provincial exam without having to succeed at the prefectural
(licensing) exams. These results are consistent with the argument that family
resources provided advantages for those competing in provincial exams.
Second, I show that the outcomes of national exams were, to a large extent,
meritocratic than provincial competitions. Success at the provincial exam
alleviated inequality of opportunity. Two proxy measures of academic com-
petence in the provincial exam, the age at passing the provincial exam and
the provincial ranking, predict national exam success. More importantly, after
controlling for these two proxy measures, fathers’ degree status and office hold-
ing are not statistically significantly associated with higher chances of passing
the national exam. However, when the family background is measured by
36Results from the specification of Column (6) in Table 2.8 are reported, where the
prefectural level degree types are not controlled for. As has been discussed, a specific
channel through which family resources contributed to younger ages at passing was through
purchasing the jiansheng degree to circumvent intensive competition in the licensing exam.
Thus, this specification is more suitable for presenting the effects of family background.
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the highest status achieved by the father, grandfather and great grandfather,
which is arguably more informative than only using the father’s status, family
background still significantly predicts national exam success even after con-
trolling for the proxy measures of competence. This results put qualifications
about the level of meritocratic competition and equality of opportunity in the
national exam.
Lastly, I find that provincial graduates from families that had held prestigious
offices had substantially better attainment in their official careers. Provincial
graduates whose fathers held high offices were much more likely to obtain high
offices themselves. While passing the national exam led to relatively equal
chances of getting some entry level appointment, those whose fathers held
high offices were much more likely to see further career advancement. The
advantages associated with fathers’ high offices were even more pronounced
when provincial graduates failed to pass the national exam. These results
thus cast serious doubt on the thesis that the imperial civil service was mer-
itocratic. Considering the historical and institutional background, I suggest
that nepotism and use of office purchase are likely to lie behind the importance
of fathers’ office holding to provincial gradates’ career paths.
Part II
A Study of Performance Appraisal
in Modern Organizations
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C h a p t e r 3
STRATEGIC MANIPULATION IN PEER PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL
This Chapter is a joint work with
Matt Shum and Xi Wu.
3.1 Introduction
Accurate and informative performance evaluation is highly valued in many or-
ganizations. It is the basis for implementing incentive plans such as merit pay
and for making critical personnel decisions such as promotions. Tradition-
ally, performance evaluation was a “top-down” system in which supervisors
assess their subordinates. However, since information of a specific employee’s
performance is dispersed among his/her supervisors, peers and subordinates,
it is reasonable to ask all the relevant people to participate in performance
evaluation.
This is the basic idea of peer performance evaluation, which is also called “360-
degree” feedback in the industry. By the 1990s, 360-degree feedback gained
huge popularity, and it is estimated that currently, over one-third of US com-
panies and more than 90% of Fortune 500 firms use some form of 360-degree
feedback (Bracken, Timmreck, and Church, 2001; Edwards and Ewen, 1996).
While peer performance evaluation can have many advantages over traditional
top-down performance evaluation, it also brings about new challenges, espe-
cially with regard to strategic reporting. For instance, as noted by Jack Welch,
a former CEO of General Electric, “Like anything driven by peer input, the sys-
tem [of peer performance evaluation] is capable of being ‘gamed’ over the long
haul”(Welch and Byrne, 2003).1 When peer evaluations are used to determine
merit pay or promotion, raters face a conflict of interest problem in evaluat-
ing their work colleagues, who are also potential competitors for promotions.
Either wittingly or unwittingly, personal interest can introduce distortions of
facts.
Despite the potential for strategic manipulation or gaming in peer perfor-
mance evaluation systems, there have been few systematic analyses of peer
1Cited in Johnson (2004).
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performance evaluation in the field. This paper aims to fill this gap. Using
proprietary data from a mid-sized Chinese auditing company which uses a peer
performance evaluation system as input into its internal promotion decisions,
we measure strategic manipulation in the system, and also examine how the
manipulation affects promotion outcomes. To our knowledge, this is one of the
first studies of peer performance appraisal utilizing field data from an actual
company.
We find several types of strategic manipulation of the peer evaluation system
in our study company. First, we find that employees at the firm tend to in-
flate their ratings of themselves; overall, however, this has a negligible impact
on any employee’s overall ratings, which are averaged across all the ratings
she received from her colleagues at the firm. Second, we find that employ-
ees discriminate against “peers” (those employees who are within the same
hierarchical rank, and hence close competitors for promotions). Specifically,
employees tend to denigrate qualified peers who have already passed objective
requirements for promotion; moreover, this denigration is amplified when a
less-qualified employee rates her more-qualified peer. This last finding is con-
sistent with psychological theories of envy and, to our knowledge, represent
some of the first quantitative evidence of envy in a field setting.
Counterfactual simulations show that this strategic manipulation of ratings to-
wards qualified peers leads to slightly lower promotion probabilities for these
qualified individuals. Altogether, this implies that more-qualified employees
“lose” from the 360-degree evaluation scheme, as their promotion chances would
be higher under the traditional “top-down” scheme in which their performance
ratings is based only on the appraisal of their superiors. However, these dif-
ferences in promotion probabilities are not big; promotion decisions are based
on an employee’s aggregate rating, which is an average of all the ratings she
received from her colleagues at the firm, and this averaging naturally limits
the damage that the strategic manipulation by any subset of employees can
cause.
Our study makes several contributions to the performance evaluation liter-
ature. First, there is an emerging literature testing potential biases dur-
ing the performance evaluation process in a traditional top-down evaluation
regime (e.g., Bol, 2011; Du, Tang, and Young, 2012). Our study provides ev-
idence of biases in an alternative regime, i.e., peer performance evaluation.
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Second, our field-based finding of peer evaluation bias supplements recent
experimental-based literature on tournaments, performance appraisal and sab-
otage (e.g., Carpenter, Matthews, and Schirm, 2010; Harbring and Irlenbusch,
2011; Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka, 2013). Finally, our study has implications
for how the popular practice of peer performance evaluation (or 360-degree
feedback) could be improved.
In Section 3.2, we review the related literature. In Section 3.3, we describe our
data and study company, and present our empirical approach for measuring
strategic manipulation in peer performance ratings. In Section 3.4, we exam-
ine the connection between performance ratings and promotion probabilities
in the study company. In section 3.5, we use the results from the preced-
ing sections to conduct counterfactual exercise aimed at showing how much
strategic manipulations of peer ratings influence promotion outcomes, and also
how outcomes would differ between peer evaluation vs. traditional “top-down”
evaluation systems. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Subjective performance evaluation is pervasive in practice, as in many cases,
employees’ performance can hardly be captured only using objective measures
(Prendergast, 1999). Economists have extensively studied the optimal incen-
tive contracting with both objective measures and subjective evaluations (e.g.,
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003). Some re-
cent studies also consider the role of peer evaluation. Kim (2011) investigates
how peer evaluation can be used to elicit information from a group of coworkers
competing for promotion when the manager only has limited knowledge about
performance. He shows that when promoting the right person is important
for the payoffs of all workers, the firm can implement optimal peer evaluation
system inducing truthful reporting which complements the manager’s assess-
ment. Deb, Li, and Mukherjee (2016) study the optimal use of peer evaluation
in a relational contract setting. They show that the use of peer evaluations in
optimal incentive contracts is fundamentally different from the use of publicly
available information— the firm may need to neglect some useful information
in peer evaluation to elicit truthful reporting. Specifically, they suggest that
peer evaluations affect a worker’s pay only in rare situations when both the
public signal and peer evaluations indicate the poorest performance. Cheng
(2015) studies how the optimal contracting depends on the degree of subjectiv-
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ity of evaluations.2 She suggests that when evaluations are not very subjective,
a cross-checking mechanism can be used to curb strategic reporting: workers
get punished when their evaluations on the same coworker disagree. However,
when evaluations become more subjective, a worker’s wage should be less sen-
sitive to both the objective measure and subjective evaluations (by self and
peers).
Some of the results in our field study are related to results from laboratory
experiments on tournaments, performance appraisal and sabotage. Carpenter,
Matthews, and Schirm (2010) find that when participants’ payoffs depend on
their relative ranking in the peer assessment, participants strategically down-
grade their ratings to peers compared to an independent objective assessment
benchmark. Specifically, individuals downgrade their peers more aggressively
when their peers perform better than themselves. They find that the scheme
of tournament with subjective peer evaluation leads to significantly inferior
outputs than piece rate pay or tournament with objective evaluation, given
that participants exert less efforts expecting that their performance may not
be objectively recognized by peers. Thus, they interpret the strategic ma-
nipulation in peer evaluation as a form of sabotage, which indirectly reduces
the output of a team. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) and Berger, Harbring,
and Sliwka (2013) show that although tournament structures (or relative per-
formance schemes in general) have the potential to incentivize higher efforts,
it also induces higher sabotage, which can reverse the incentive effects. In
particular, higher wage spread leads to higher level of sabotage.
3.3 Empirical Approach and Results
3.3.1 Institutional Background
The data used in our study were retrieved from a Chinese audit firm’s person-
nel archive and performance appraisal archive, covering a five-year period from
2010 to 2014. The participating firm ranks between 10th and 20th during our
sample period according to the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants’ national ranking of public accounting firms, and has the license to audit
Chinese listed companies as well. The main business lines include audits, as-
set appraisals, and other accounting services. The audit firm adopts a 13-level
hierarchical system for each practicing office, ranging from the partner (level
2The level of subjectivity is the extent to which signals received by workers about a
particular coworker are correlated. Less correlation means more subjective.
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1) to the intern (level 13). The normal promotion decision involves employees
ranging from level 12 (junior audit assistant) to level 2 (department head).
As a trial, one of the firm’s practicing offices has been using the 360-degree
approach for employee performance evaluation since 2010.
360-degree appraisal was conducted annually in the office for the period from
1 July of year t to 30 June of year t+1, which serves as the basis for promotion
decisions. Within each of the 7 departments of the office, every employee is
asked to evaluate everyone else in the team as well as to conduct self-evaluation.
The maintenance of anonymity of each participant’s evaluations is instructed
in the evaluation form. Moreover, evaluation outcomes (either in terms of
scores or rankings) are not disclosed to employees except for each department
head (who needs to participate in the employee promotion decisions).
In what follows, we will use the terms “rater ”and “ratee ”to refer to, respec-
tively, a given employee and one of the colleagues that she is asked to rate.
In the original evaluation forms, a rater need to evaluate the ratee along 30
dimensions, including professional knowledge and skills, project management
skills, leadership, teamwork, work ethics, efficiency and accountability and so
on. A 0-to-10 numeric scale is used in each evaluation dimension, where 0
indicates the poorest performance and 10 the best. In the office’s incentive
system, only the overall ratings (i.e., averaged over all the dimensions) are
used. In our study, we use these aggregated overall ratings. Each observation
in our dataset is a rating record, specifying the year of rating, the rater, the
ratee, performance rating (averaged over the 30 dimensions), and information
about the rater and ratee (e.g., department affiliation, rank at the time of per-
formance evaluation, age, gender, educational background). We have a total
of 7346 rater-ratee-year observations for the five years comprising 153 unique
employees in 7 departments of the firm.3
After the 360-degree performance appraisal, the executives and department
heads meet to discuss promotion decisions. According to the firm’s promotion
guidelines, there are two aspects of requirements that an employee need to
meet in order to be promoted. First, the relative ranking of her performance
appraisal rating need to be among the top 50% in the group of employees who
are in the same level in her department. Second, for each level, there are some
3There are additional self-evaluation observations which are not included in our main
analysis but are used in some supplementary analyses.
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objective qualifications for promotion, including attendance, academic quali-
fications, project experience, and tenure. The human resource team records
these qualifications and employees knows whether they meet these qualifica-
tions or not.
3.3.2 Detecting Strategic Reporting
In peer performance evaluation, the rater’s strategic reporting can include
inflating self-evaluation and deflating the ratings given to others. This self-
interested manipulation benefits the rater while hurts the ratee. Moreover, it
can distort the overall accuracy and effectiveness of performance evaluation
thus harming the interests of the organization.
Our main objective is to examine whether raters do, indeed, report strategi-
cally when evaluating their colleagues. Since there are few models of strategic
behavior in a peer evaluation setting to guide our work, we use a flexible ap-
proach to assessing the degree of strategic behavior, and “let the data speak for
themselves.” Our general principle in looking for strategic behavior is that a
rater’s perceived benefit from strategically downgrading a ratee increases with
the rater’s perceived degree of competition between the two. The intuition
for how we detect strategic behavior derives from the consideration that when
strategic reporting is detected, it tarnishes the rater’s reputation for integrity,
and may lead to punishment or revenge. For this reason, a ratee will typically
not simply downgrade all her colleagues across the board; rather she should
be selective in whom she downgrades. Since the benefits from downgrading
should be largest vis-a-vis those colleagues with whom a rater is directly com-
peting for a promotion, the extent that the rater downgrades a peer ratee
should depend on the perceived intensity of competition between them. More
direct and more intense competition between the rater and ratee leads to more
aggressive manipulation.
Specifically, we will focus on how an employee’s rating of a particular colleague
depends on variables which are related to whether these two employees may
be competing for a promotion. The two main variables we consider are, first,
whether the two employees are “peers”, in the sense that they are in the same
hierarchical rank within the company; and, second, whether either of these
employees are qualified in that they have already passed other hurdles for
promotion.
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3.3.3 Some Simple Evidence on the Existence of Strategic Behavior
We start by providing some simple evidence showing that employees are indeed
pursuing their self-interest in their rating behavior. We ask a simple question:
how much do an employee’s own ratings (of herself and of others) lead to a
better performance ranking in the department than what she actually achieves
in the appraisal? In other words, how would an employee’s appraisal result
be improved if the result was dictated by her own ratings? As a reminder, an
employee’s own ratings include her self-evaluation and her ratings to others
in the department. To answer this question, we define a measure ∆PRself =
PRself − PRactual, where PRself is the employee’s percentile rank4 according
to her own rating and PRactual is her percentile rank in the actual appraisal
result. Since higher percentile rank corresponds to better relative ranking, a
positive ∆PRself implies that the employee’s relative ranking according to her
own ratings is better than what she actually achieves in the appraisal. Figure
3.1 is the histogram of ∆PRself and Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics
of these three variables.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of ∆PRself , PRself , and PRactual
Variables # Obs. Mean SD Min Q1 (25%) Median Q3 (75%) Max
∆PRself 436 0.0634 0.1710 -0.625 0 0.0426 0.1304 0.85
PRself 436 0.5732 0.2993 0 0.3377 0.6099 0.8333 1
PRactual 436 0.5098 0.3105 0 0.25 0.5 0.7778 1
Notes: These summary statistics are computed over common observations.
The results suggest that an employee’s percentile rank is substantially higher
according to her own ratings, compared with the actual appraisal result.
Specifically, on average an employee would improve her percentile rank by
about 6.3% if the appraisal result was dictated by her own ratings. These
results show that employees are indeed pursuing their self-interest with their
ratings.
3.3.4 Ratee Qualification and Strategic Rating
As discussed above, our method for detecting strategic reporting behavior
involves comparing ratings across employees who differ in their likelihood of
4If there are n people and an employee is ranked as the k-th highest, then her percentile
rank is k−1n−1 . She gets a percentile rank of 1 if she obtains the highest rating, while a
percentile rank of 0 corresponds to the poorest rating in the department.
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of ∆PRself
being promoted. To model the likelihood of promotion among employees, we
collected information about whether an employee satisfied promotion criteria
in the given year from the firm’s personnel archive. As specified in the firm’s
guidelines for promotion, for being considered for promotion, each employee
needs to pass certain minimum requirements in terms of attendance, academic
qualifications, project experience, and tenure. An analysis of the promotion
records indicated that employees who failed to pass the promotion criteria had
a much lower promotion rate compared with those who passed them. We define
the binary variable RateeQual equal to one if the ratee has already passed
these promotion criteria, and zero otherwise. We define a second variable,
PEER, which equals one if the rater and ratee are of the same rank, and zero
otherwise.
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Empirical Specification
Our main empirical model is the following:
RATINGijt =β0 + β1PEERijt + β2RateeQualjt + β3PEERijt ×RateeQualjt
+ γjtX
′
jt + β4DEPTijt + β5Y EARt + ijt.
In the regression equation, RATINGijt denotes the rating that rater i gives to
ratee j at year t. The rating scale ranges from zero to ten with 0 as denoting
the poorest performance and 10 denoting the highest level of performance.
X ′jt denotes ratee rank and ratee fixed-effect dummies; DEPTijt and Y EARt
denote dummy variables for department and year fixed-effects.
Some careful analysis is needed for interpreting coefficients in this model. To
do so, we introduce two important concepts, “qualification premium”, and “peer
difference”, which represent two alternative ways of interpreting and measuring
strategic manipulation of ratings using the coefficients in the regression model.
We define the “rating function”
R(PEER,RateeQual) = β1PEER+ β2RateeQual+ β3PEER×RateeQual.
We introduce the notion of “qualification premium”, which captures the rating
premium given to ratees who have already passed promotion requirements.
We define the qualification premium
∆QUAL(PEER) =
R(1, 1)−R(1, 0) = β2 + β3 if PEER = 1R(0, 1)−R(0, 0) = β2 if PEER = 0.
Similarly, we introduce a notion of “peer differnece”:
∆PEER(RateeQual) =
R(1, 1)−R(0, 1) = β1 + β3 if RateeQual = 1R(1, 0)−R(0, 0) = β1 if RateeQual = 0.
From the above two definitions, we can see that β1 captures the peer differ-
ence when the ratee has failed promotion requirements, and β2 measures the
qualification premium when the rater and ratee are not peers.
How do we identify and measure strategic manipulation? We start by con-
sidering what coefficients in our model should look like when there is no
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strategic manipulation. Without manipulation, we expect peer raters and
non-peer raters to behave similarly in recognizing peer premiums. In other
words, a rater’s measured qualification premium – that is, how much bet-
ter she rates other employees who have passed objective promotion require-
ments – should not depend on whether the ratee is a peer or not. That is,
∆QUAL(1) = ∆QUAL(0), which implies that β3 = 0. We can also consider
this from the perspective of peer difference. Without manipulation, we expect
the peer difference to be independent of whether the peer ratee has passed
requirement or not. That is, ∆PEER(1) = ∆PEER(0), which also gives to
β3 = 0. To sum up, we expect β3 = 0, in the absence of strategic manipulation.
Moreover, insofar as employees who have passed these promotion requirements
have higher ability or have exhibited better work performance, we expect that
ratees with RateeQual = 1 should receive a positive qualification premium
from both peer raters and non-peer raters. That is, ∆QUAL(1) > 0 and
∆QUAL(0) > 0, which implies that β2 > 0 and β2 + β3 > 0. If the rater’s
evaluation does not depend on whether the rater and ratee are peers, we expect
the peer difference to be zero. That is, β1 = β3 = 0.
When β3 < 0, we have ∆QUAL(1) < ∆QUAL(0) and ∆PEER(1) < ∆PEER(0).
The former condition means that the rater’s attitude towards passing require-
ments depends on whether the ratee is a peer. Specifically, the rater gives
more generous ratings to peer ratees who have failed requirements, and deni-
grates peer ratees who have passed these requirements. These are consistent
with strategic manipulation: since peers who have failed requirements are less
threatening to the rater compared with peers who have passed, we would ex-
pect a self-interested rater to strategically downgrade peers who have passed
requirements. We label β3 as “manipulation measure”, since it captures how
much a rater strategically downgrades qualified peers who have already passed
important promotion requirements, and upgrades less qualified peers who have
not yet passed these requirements.
Empirical Results
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results of the OLS regression analysis with
robust standard errors clustered by ratee and year. In Figure 3.2 we graph the
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implied qualification premium and peer differences, using estimated coefficients
from Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Ratee Qualification and Performance Rating: Difference between
Peer and Nonpeer Raters
Ratee’s performance rating
(1)
Independent Variables OLS
Peer 0.436***
(0.0610)
RateeQual 0.165***
(0.0418)
Peer × RateeQual -0.493***
(0.0792)
Ratee rank fixed-effects Yes
Ratee fixed-effects Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes
Department fixed-effects Yes
Observations 7346
Adjusted R2 0.393
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by ratee and year are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Overall, the empirical results suggest that raters do recognize the positive
qualification premiums that non-peer ratees deserve (i.e., β2 > 0). However,
when the rater is a peer, not only does this qualification premium decrease
(i.e., ∆QUAL(0) − ∆QUAL(1) = β3 < 0), it indeed becomes negative (i.e.,
∆QUAL(1) < 0). In other words, ceteris paribus, if the ratee passed pro-
motion requirements, compared with the case of not passing, he/she would
secure higher ratings from non-peer raters, and get lower ratings from peer
raters. The regression coefficient of the interaction term between QUAL and
RateeQual, β3, captures this difference of qualification premiums between peer
raters and non-peer raters.
These results indicate a “discriminatory generosity” on the part of peer raters,
leading them to denigrate the relative ranking of peer ratees who have already
passed promotion requirements. This is consistent with our notion of strategic
reporting.
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Figure 3.2: Ratee Qualification Premium and Peer Difference Illustrated
3.3.5 Rater Qualification and Strategic Rating
In the preceding analysis, we found a sophisticated form of strategic manipu-
lation that the raters give generous ratings to peers who have not yet passed
promotion requirements, while they become harsher in rating peers who have
passed. To further examine the strategic rating behavior, we now explore the
question of how the rater’s qualification affect his/her rating decision. That is,
do qualified raters, who have already passed promotion requirements, behave
differently from less-qualified raters who have not yet passed these require-
ments? Answering this question is important for understanding which group
(qualified or unqualified raters) drives our previous results.
Empirical Specification
Our empirical model for investigating this question is as follows:
RATINGijt =β0 + β1PEERijt + β2RateeQualjt + β3PEERijt ×RateeQualjt
+ β4RaterQualjt + β5PEERijt ×RaterQualjt
+ β6RateeQualijt ×RaterQualjt
+ β7PEERijt ×RateeQualjt ×RaterQualjt
+ γjtX
′
jt + β8DEPTijt + β9Y EARt + ijt.
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When RaterQual = 0, this equation reduces to the regression equation as in
the Section 3.3.4. When RaterQual = 1, the equation reduces to:
RATINGijt =(β0 + β4) + (β1 + β5)PEERijt + (β2 + β6)RateeQualjt
+ (β3 + β7)PEERijt ×RateeQualjt + γjtX ′jt + β8DEPTijt
+ β9Y EARt + ijt.
We labeled the coefficient of the interaction term between PEER andRateeQual
as manipulation measure. When RaterQual = 0, the manipulation measure is
β3; when RaterQual = 1, then it equals β3 + β7. Thus β7 captures the change
in manipulation measure between raters who have and have not already passed
the promotion requirements. If β7 > 0, it implies that raters who have not
yet passed requirements are more manipulative than those who have passed;
if β7 < 0 implies that raters with RaterQual = 0 are less manipulative.
Empirical Results
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results of the OLS regression analysis with
robust standard errors clustered by ratee and year. Figure 3.3 shows the
qualification premium and peer difference by different values of RaterQual,
using the estimated coefficients from Table 3.3. The top two sub-figures in
Figure 3.3 are about qualified raters, and the bottom two sub-figures are for
unqualified raters.
In Table 3.3 , β7 is significantly positive, which indicates that raters who have
not yet passed promotion requirements are more manipulative than those who
have passed. Notably, β3 < 0 (−0.380) but β3 + β7 is slightly positive (0.027).
These patterns can also be illustrated graphically. From Figure 3.3 , we can
further see that raters who have passed requirements behave exactly the same
as our expectation in the absence of manipulation. They recognize positive
qualification premiums no matter raters are peers or not. Also, their rat-
ings given to peer ratees and non-peer ratees are almost the same (i.e., peer
differences are almost zero), no matter ratees have passed requirements or
not. On the other hand, raters who have not yet passed requirements behave
strategically in a similar fashion as what we see in Figure 3.2. They recognize
a positive qualification premium for unqualified peers while give a negative
qualification premium for qualified peers. An alternative way to interpret this
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is that when a rater’s peers have not yet passed promotion requirements, the
rater recognizes a positive peer difference; however the peer difference becomes
negative when vis-a-vis qualified peers.
This finding, that strategic manipulation is driven by less-qualified raters who
have have not yet passed promotion requirements, and directed at qualified
ratees who have passed these requirements, is broadly consistent with existing
theories in the literature on envy. Smith and Kim (2007, pp. 46-50), in their
review of the psychological literature, define envy as the unpleasant emotion
arising when we compare unfavorably with others who enjoy an advantage
in a desired domain linked to our self-worth. Similarly, the social psychol-
ogy literature (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007) pinpoints envy as arising in
scenarios when an agent faces unfriendly, but highly competent individuals.
Specific conditions of the peer evaluation environment in our study firm align
with factors which have been pointed out in the literature as conducive to
envy. Similarities between the envied and the envying and self-relevance of
the comparison domain are necessary to make social comparisons relevant
(e.g., Schaubroeck and Lam, 2004; Salovey and Rodin, 1984). Moreover, the
people feeling envy need to believe that the desired advantage cannot be eas-
ily obtained (e.g., Testa and Major, 1990). In our study company, raters and
ratees who are peers are within the same rank in he organizational hierarchy
of the company, and share many job responsibilities; moreover, the objective
promotion requirements, involving adequate tenure at the company and pass-
ing professional examinations, are not simple to pass. To our knowledge, then,
our findings here constitute some of the first quantitative evidence supporting
these theories of envy in a field setting.
3.4 Ratings and Promotion Decisions
Next we study the promotion decisions. Our main question is that to which
extent good performance ratings and passing promotion requirements affected
an employee’s chances of being promoted within the company. We collected
annual promotion outcomes from the firm’s personnel archive.
Table 3.4 presents estimation results of our logistic regression model using
promotion dummy as the dependent variable. In these regressions, we use as
a regressor the percentile of an employee’s of average performance rating in
a given year, rather than the raw numerical performance rating. First, the
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Table 3.3: Rater and Ratee Qualifications and Performance Rating
Ratee’s performance rating
(1)
Independent Variables OLS
Peer 0.322***
(0.0607)
RateeQual 0.188***
(0.0495)
Peer × RateeQual -0.379***
(0.1025)
RaterQual 0.154***
(0.0400)
Peer × RaterQual -0.331***
(0.0981)
RaterQual × RateeQual -0.122**
(0.0485)
Peer × RateeQual × RaterQual 0.406***
(0.135)
Rater rank flxed-effects Yes
Ratee rank fixed-effects Yes
Ratee fixed-effects Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes
Department fixed-effects Yes
Observations 7346
Adjusted R2 0.466
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by ratee and year are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respec-
tively (two-tailed).
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Figure 3.3: Ratee Qualification Premium and Peer Difference by Rater
Qualification
firm uses relative rankings in performance evaluation to specify the minimum
requirement for being considered for promotion. Second, the rating percentile
provides a more comparable measure across years, since it is invariant to fluc-
tuations of rating leniency over the five years of our sample. License dummy,
which indicates whether the employee made satisfactory progress in the pro-
fessional exams (e.g., CPA exams) in his/her level, is included as a control
variable. In addition, we control for rank dummies, year-fixed effects and
department fixed-effects.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Promotion
Promotion dummy
(1) (1)
Logit Logit
PR_dep 6.721*** 5.472***
(1.235) (1.088)
QUAL 1.546*** 0.490
(0.555) (0.324)
PR_dep × QUAL -2.572**
(1.070)
License dummy 1.373*** 1.282***
(0.393) (0.391)
Constant -3.408*** -2.850***
(0.826) (0.784)
Rank fixed-effects Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Department fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 426 426
Pseudo R2 0.380 0.370
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respec-
tively (two-tailed).
In Table 3.4, Column 1 presents the specification which includes the percentile
ranking, the pass dummy and the interaction term between them. The coeffi-
cients for the percentile and the pass dummy are both positive and significant
at 1%, but the coefficient for the percentile is much larger. The interaction
term is negative and significant at 5%. Column 2 presents the specification
without the interaction term. While the coefficient of the pass dummy re-
mains positive, the statistical significance weakened (p-value = 0.13). In both
specifications, the license dummy is positive and significant at 1%.
These results suggest, first, that passing the requirements contributes to pro-
motion, but its effect is not as significant as the performance rating. Second,
the negative coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the marginal
importance of performance rating decreases as the employee passes promotion
requirements. In other words, a good performance rating is more important for
those who have not yet passed promotion requirements. These results suggest
substitutability between performance rating and passing requirements.
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This pattern of substitutability sheds lights on our earlier findings of strategic
manipulation. Specifically, the fact that raters who have passed promotion
requirement are less manipulative can be caused by that their benefit from
a better standing in performance evaluation is less attractive compared with
those who have not yet passed requirements.
3.5 Policy Implications: 360-degree Appraisal vs. Alternative Per-
formance Rating Systems
In previous rating-level analysis, we identify patterns of strategic manipula-
tion when employees are rating their peers. Specifically, we find that employees
who had not yet passed promotion requirements downgraded their peers who
had passed and upgraded their peers who have not yet passed, compared with
nonpeer employees’ rating behavior. We also find that employees who had
already passed promotion requirements did not exhibit this discriminatory be-
havior. Logically, we expect this to distort the aggregated appraisal results
in a direction that benefits those who have not yet passed promotion require-
ments, who manipulated ratings to improve their relative ranking among their
peers. Whether and to which extent the strategic manipulation biases ap-
praisal results and promotion outcomes is a question of significant practical
implications.
Another important question is how the results of the 360-degree appraisal
differ from that of the traditional “top-down” appraisal system where only
supervisors evaluate their subordinates. We examine this question by using
department heads’ ratings to proxy for counterfactual ratings under the top-
down appraisal system. This is reasonable because department heads typically
do not face direct competition from their subordinates and the anonymity of
department heads ratings is strictly protected in the auditing firm under our
study. Therefore the presence of their subordinates in 360-degree appraisal
should not distort department heads’ evaluation behavior.
In this section, we will explore these two questions. We start by analyz-
ing the correlations between different components of 360-degree performance
appraisal, including ratings from department heads, peers, nonpeers, and self-
evaluations. Then we conduct counterfactual analysis of promotion outcomes
based on the historical relationship between appraisal results and promotion
records, to see how promotion outcomes would change if only ratings of one of
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these components (i.e, department heads, peers, nonpeers, or self-evaluations)
are used as the basis for making promotion decisions.
3.5.1 Correlations between Ratings from Department Heads, Peers,
Nonpeers, and Self-evaluations
In the 360-degree appraisal system, each employee receives evaluations from
his/her department head, peers, nonpeers and also conducts self-evaluation.
Do these different components of the aggregate rating agree with each other?
To answer this question, we consider correlation patterns between the different
components. We aggregate performance ratings at the individual level and,
for each employee, we compute his/her overall average rating 5 (rating_avg),
average rating from the department head (rating_head), average rating from
peers (rating_peers), average rating from nonpeers 6 (rating_nonpeer), and
average self-rating (rating_self). Table 3.5 presents the correlation matrix
of these variables.
Table 3.5: Correlation Matrix: Average Ratings from Different Components
Variables Rating_avg Rating_head Rating_peer Rating_nonpeer Rating_self
Rating_avg 1.0000
Rating_head 0.8336*** 1.0000
(0.0000)
Rating_peer 0.6192*** 0.5202*** 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Rating_nonpeer 0.9819*** 0.8268*** 0.4899*** 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Rating_self 0.4477*** 0.4389*** 0.4479*** 0.4091*** 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: P-values are in parenthesis. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
If we exclude the department head’s ratings in computing rating_nonpeer, then its correlation coefficients
with rating_avg, rating_head, rating_peer and rating_self would be 0.9714, 0.7617, 0.4739 and 0.3867
respectively, and the significance levels all remain at 1%.
Results in Table 3.5 indicate that ratings from peers are less correlated to the
department head’s ratings than ratings from nonpeers (0.5202 vs. 0.8268).
Interpreting department heads’ ratings as a nonstrategic benchmark, this is
consistent with our basic notion that peers are more likely to manipulate their
5We excluded self-evaluation from computing the overall average rating. However, the
results change very little when self-evaluations are included.
6Department heads’ ratings are included in computing the average rating from nonpeers.
In the note to Table 3.5, we report the results when ratings of department heads are excluded.
As we can see, there are only very small changes.
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ratings strategically than nonpeers. In addition, department heads’ ratings
and the overall average ratings are highly correlated (with a correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.8336). Lastly, average ratings from nonpeers and the overall average
ratings have a correlation coefficient as high as 0.9819. This suggests that
the peer evaluation part of the appraisal only leads to a very limited degree
of discrepancy between average nonpeer ratings and the overall ratings in our
study. These results remain robust if we use percentile ranks of average ratings
within department instead of the average ratings.
3.5.2 Counterfactual Analysis of Promotion Outcomes
In this section we use our results to answer several counterfactual questions of
interest. First, how much does the strategic manipulation in peer evaluation
which we have uncovered so far affect promotion outcomes? Who are the
winners and losers from strategic manipulation? Second, how do the outcomes
from 360-degree appraisal differ from the outcomes from the traditional top-
down approach, where only supervisors evaluate their subordinates? Who are
the winners and losers in moving from the traditional appraisal system to the
360-degree system?
All these questions involve some counterfactual reasoning about promotion
outcomes. This requires us to link promotion decisions with appraisal results,
so that we can analyze how changes in the latter would affect the former. While
recognizing the general challenges involved, we use the empirical relationship
between appraisal results and promotion, as estimated in Table 4 (column 1),
as the basis for these counterfactual evaluations.
Four Counterfactual Scenarios
There are four counterfactual scenarios to consider.
(1) The scenario that appraisal results are determined only by the department
heads’ ratings (denoted as CShead). We use this to proxy for the rating that
an employee would have received in a counterfactual top-down performance
evaluation scenario.
(2) The scenario that appraisal results are determined only by the peer eval-
uation part of the 360-degree appraisal (denoted as CSpeer). This helps us to
examine whether the identified strategic manipulation in the peer evaluation
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leads to an aggregated direction that benefits those “manipulators" who have
not yet passed promotion requirements.
(3) The scenario that appraisal results are determined only by the nonpeer
part of the 360-degree appraisal (denoted as CSnonpeer). That is, all peer
evaluations in the original appraisal are dropped. CSnonpeer helps us to see to
which extent the peer evaluation part distorts overall promotion outcomes.
(4) The scenario that appraisal results are determined only by self-evaluations
(denoted as CSself ). Specifically, in this scenario, an employee’s percentile
rank is determined by the relative ranking of her self-evaluation compared
with the ratings she gives to others in the department.7 This scenario helps
to examine to which extent employees give ratings in favor of themselves.
In each case, we will use the corresponding counterfactual appraisal results
to compute the counterfactual probability of promotion (denoted as PCS) for
each employee, employing the fitted logistic model of promotion decision in
Table 4. Then, we compare the counterfactual promotion probabilities with
actual promotion probabilities (denoted as Pactual) which are the predicted
promotion probabilities using the actual appraisal results. We define ∆CS =
PCS − Pactual as the increase of promotion probability in the counterfactual
scenario compared with the actual case. For example, if an employee’s Pactual is
0.3 and Phead is 0.4, then her ∆head is 0.1. That is, her probability of promotion
would increase by 0.1 if the promotion decision was solely determined by her
department head’s rating.
Results
Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the counterfactual changes in pro-
motion probabilities corresponding to the four scenarios.
The most notable result in Table 6 is that employees increased their promo-
tion probabilities if the appraisal results were determined by their own ratings.
In this scenario, 42.79% of employees increased their promotion probabilities
while only 31.84% of employees had decreased promotion promotion probabil-
ities. On average, an employee increased her promotion probability by about
4% under the counterfactual scenario of CSself , which represents an increase
7If there are n people in her department and she rates herself the k-th highest in the
department, then her percentile rank in CSself is k−1n−1 .
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics: Counterfactual Changes of Promotion
Probability
Variables # obs. mean median SD % negative % zero % positive
∆head 426 -0.0125 0 0.1060 38.97 28.64 32.39
∆peer 368 0.0079 0 0.1566 37.50 24.18 38.32
∆nonpeer 426 0.0003 0 0.0677 27.46 47.18 25.35
∆self 402 0.0398 0 0.1398 31.84 25.37 42.79
of 7.6% (the average probability of actual promotion is 55.59%). This result
characterizes the extent to which one’s self-evaluation promotes self-interest.
In fact, this result is driven by that self-evaluation tends to inflate one’s own
percentile rank. As shown in Table 1, the percentile rank according to one’s
own ratings (PR_self) has a mean of 0.57, while the percentile rank in the
actual appraisal result is close to 0.5.
Table 7 presents the correlation matrix of these four counterfactual changes
in promotion probabilities together with QUAL, the dummy of passing pro-
motion requirements. There are two striking results. First, ∆peer and ∆nonpeer
have a significantly negative correlation coefficient of −0.2830. This is the only
pair of ∆CS variables that are negatively correlated, suggesting that these two
counterfactual scenarios lead to different consequences upon promotion out-
comes. This result is consistent with our expectation that peer evaluation and
nonpeer evaluation reflect different motives in the rater. Second, ∆peer and
QUAL are negatively correlated (−0.1025, and significant at 5%), which is
consistent with our earlier finding that ratings by peers are most biased when
the rater has not yet passed promotion requirements.
To further explore how employees who have and have not yet passed pro-
motion requirements would be differentially affected, we run regressions of
counterfactual promotion probabilities (i.e, ∆CS) on QUAL as well as addi-
tional variables and fixed effects, in order to control for other determinants of
promotion. Table 8 presents the regression results.
First, results in Column (1) suggests that employees who passed promotion
thresholds enjoy a higher promotion probability under the downward appraisal
scenario (CShead), in which performance ratings are determined solely by de-
partment heads. This suggests that relatively qualified employees – those who
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Table 3.7: Correlation Matrix:
QUAL dummy and Counterfactual Changes of Promotion Probability
Variables QUAL ∆head ∆peer ∆nonpeer ∆self
QUAL 1.0000
∆head 0.0169 1.0000
(0.7468)
∆peer -0.1025** 0.1258** 1.0000
(0.0494) (0.0158)
∆nonpeer -0.0611 0.1779*** -0.2830*** 1.0000
(0.2422) (0.0006) (0.0000)
∆self 0.0334 0.3038*** 0.2182*** 0.1654*** 1.0000
(0.5367) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0021)
Notes: *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
P-values are in parentheses. The first three rows are computed using the 368
common observations of QUAL, ∆head, ∆peer, and ∆nonpeer. The last row
is computed using the 345 common observations of all variables in this table.
This difference is due to missing values in self-evaluation.
Table 3.8: Counterfactual Analysis of Promotion Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆head ∆peer ∆nonpeer ∆self
QUAL 0.0205* -0.0322* -0.00978 0.0164
(0.0118) (0.0181) (0.00760) (0.0159)
License 0.0123 -0.0417* 0.00282 -0.0135
(0.0143) (0.0222) (0.00921) (0.0192)
Constant -0.0123 0.126*** 0.0279 0.0216
(0.0272) (0.0422) (0.0175) (0.0367)
Rank fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 426 368 426 402
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.019 -0.000 0.025
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
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have already passed promotion requirements – could be hurt (although in a
small magnitude as suggested in the coefficient) in moving from the traditional
downward appraisal to 360-degree appraisal, due to strategic manipulation.
Second, results in Column (2) show that peer evaluation, in the aggregate,
benefits those “manipulators" who are the relatively less qualified employees –
those who have not yet passed promotion requirements, and echoes our earlier
empirical results showing how less qualified raters tend to denigrate their more
qualified peers in the ratings process. The coefficient of License suggests that
a qualified employee who achieved progress in professional certification exams
as expected in their levels would suffer a decrease in promotion probability by
4.17% if the appraisal results were incorporated ratings only from peers. In
contrast, a less-qualified employee who has not yet passed promotion require-
ments would be better off, increasing the probability of promotion by 3.22%
under CSpeer.
Third, results in Column (3), however, suggests that the peer evaluation does
not impose an impact substantial enough to benefit those who have not yet
passed promotion requirements. The reason is that ratings by peers, which are
the “problematic” ones, only constitute a minor proportion of the ratings: only
15.14% of the total ratings within the firm and, if one considers only ratings
within a department, much less than that (because peers in the same hierar-
chical rank are separated into different departments). Moreover, the averaging
of individual ratings as part of the 360-degree appraisal system further dilutes
the effects of these peer ratings on overall ratings.
Finally, results in Column (4) suggests that self-evaluations do not lead to
a discriminatory consequence for those who passed promotion requirements,
although we have already shown that, of course, raters would benefit if their
overall rating were completely determined their own self-evaluations.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have utilized unique proprietary data from a mid-sized Chinese
auditing firm to examine the extent of strategic maneuvering in a 360-degree
peer evaluation system. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that employees at the
firm tend to inflate their own “self-ratings”, but overall this has a negligible
impact on any employee’s overall ratings, which are averaged across all the
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ratings she received from her colleagues at the firm. More subtly, we find that
employees use different rating schemes to evaluate “peers” (those employees
who are within the same hierarchical rank, and hence close competitors for
promotions). Specifically, more qualified peers are systematically downgraded,
and this effect is amplified when a less-qualified employees is rating her more-
qualified peer. Such behavior is broadly in line with psychological notions of
“envy” or “spite”.
Counterfactual simulations show that this strategic manipulation of ratings
towards qualified peers leads to slightly lower promotion probabilities for these
qualified individuals. Moreover, in the benchmark where promotional decisions
are based only on superiors’ ratings of employees (the traditional “top-down”
appraisal system), qualified employees would also be promoted with higher
probability than under 360-degree appraisal. While these changes in promotion
probabilities are not big, they do highlight avenues in which the 360-degree
appraisal system could be improved.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Licensing Examination in Changshu and Zhaowen Counties
Alumni directories for licensing exams had not been complied and preserved
for most localities. There were only three licensing exam directories left. I
analyzed the directory of Changshu and Zhaowen counties of Suzhou prefecture
(Yuyang Keming Lu) from 1821-1874. The results are summarized in Table
A.1. Some explanation about the source is necessary for understanding the
Table A.1. The licensing exam directory did not directly list each licentiate’s
ancestors’ background directory. Instead, for each licentiate, it listed only one
of his paternal ancestors (or brothers) who also passed the licensing exam.
When a licentiate had multiple paternal relatives who obtained the licentiate
degree, only the “closest” paternal relative would be indicated, following the
descending order of father, grandfather, uncles, and others.
Table A.1: Family Background of Licentiates in Changshu and Zhaowen
(1821-1874)
Emperor Period Father Grandfather Uncles
Great &
Great-great
Grandfathers
Uncles’
Fathers &
Grandfathers
Brothers None in 5Generations Total
Daoguang 1821-1850 205 42 33 10 3 35 263 591
34.70% 7.10% 5.60% 1.70% 0.50% 5.90% 44.50%
Xianfeng 1851-1861 84 18 13 7 2 18 80 222
37.80% 8.10% 5.90% 3.20% 0.90% 8.10% 36.00%
Tongzhi 1862-1874 147 27 21 2 1 25 180 403
36.50% 6.70% 5.20% 0.50% 0.20% 6.20% 44.70%
Total 1821-1874 436 87 67 19 6 78 523 1216
35.90% 7.20% 5.50% 1.60% 0.50% 6.40% 43.00%
Three rules are important for our analysis. First, whenever the father passed
the licensing exam, the father would be the one to be recorded. Second, when
several licentiates were brothers, and their father did not obtain the licentiate
degree, then the eldest brother would be indicated for all the younger brothers.
For the eldest brother, a licentiate paternal ancestor would be indicated if he
had any. Third, if no relative of the licentiate was indicated, then it means he
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had no parental relatives who passed the licensing exam in the preceding four
generations.
From Table A.1, we can see that the percentage of licentiates whose father
also obtained the licentiate degree was about 36%, which was stable under
the three reigns. The percentage of “new blood” licentiates who had no pa-
ternal ancestors in the preceding four generations was 43% on average. This
percentage was lower in the Xianfeng reign (1851-1861), in which the most
significant event was the massive civil war, Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864).
Ho (1962) also analyzed this directory, however, Ho only discussed the “new
blood” category. To recover father-son transition probabilities, the percentage
of licentiates whose fathers passed the licensing exam is crucial. Moreover, this
more detailed classification is helpful for understanding to which extent those
whose father did not obtain the licentiate degree had other licentiate paternal
ancestors. This percentage was about 20%.1
1The percentages in the “None in 4 generations” column in the table are likely lower than
the actual percentage. If several licentiates were brothers and they had no licentiate paternal
ancestors in the preceding four generations, only the eldest brother would be recorded as
“none”and his younger brothers would be indicated as his brothers. In other words, some
observations in the “Brothers” column were also “new blood”. In the sample of licentiates,
the percentage of licentiates whose father was not a licentiate was about 64%. And about
15% had licentiate ancestors but not licentiate father (not counting the “Brothers” category).
The percentage is computed using 15%/64%, which is 23.4%.
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A.2 Robustness Check
For provincial graduates who passed the exam from 1810 to 1840, their fathers
lived around the same period as the grandfathers of provincial graduates who
passed the exam from 1840 to 1870. I construct the a subsample contain-
ing these transitions. Table A.2 presents the results. These results preserve
the main findings in Table 1.9: provincial graduates’ grandfathers had higher
chances of obtaining higher degree status than their fathers.
Table A.2: Robustness Check: Subsample of Ancestors Who Lived in the
Same Period But Belonged to Different Transitions
(1) (2)
Degreeyounger generation Degreeyounger generation
Degreeolder generation:
Purchased 1.278*** 1.386***
(0.104) (0.137)
Prefectural 1.916*** 1.932***
(0.119) (0.163)
Prov./Nat. 3.302*** 3.328***
(0.215) (0.310)
GF-F dummy
(grandfather-father transition)
0.577***
(0.133)
Interaction terms:
None × GF-F 0.713***
(0.178)
Purchased × GF-F 0.462***
(0.175)
Prefectural × GF-F 0.667***
(0.203)
Prov./Nat. × GF-F 0.0969
(0.398)
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 1930 1930
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.091
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
110
A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Additional Results
I present some additional descriptive data analysis. In particular, I examine
changes and trends over time, with special attention paid to changes before
and after the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864).
I start by exploring the the trends in the ages of passing the provincial exam
over time. Figure B.1 presents the results for 39 out the total 43 provincial
exams during the period from 1804 to 1903.1 The mean, median, 25-percentile
and 75-percentile of ages at passing the provincial exam are highlighted by
different curves. 1804 was the first year when official rosters of Jiangnan
provincial exams started to record the ages of successful candidates. 1903 was
the last provincial exam before the abolition of the imperial exam system in
1905. The most significant pattern is the decline of ages at passing after the
Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864).
Four Jiangnan provincial exams (1855, 1858, 1861, and 1862) were interrupted
by the Taiping occupation of Nanjing (1853-1864), the provincial exam center
for Jiangnan region. Quotas in these four interrupted exams were added into
later exams (1859, 1864, 1867, and 1870). During the Taiping occupation,
the only Jiangnan provincial was held in its neighboring Zhejiang province in
1859. The average age at passing was 33.3 in the period from 1804 to 1852,
slightly increased during the Taiping interruption, and then declined to 30.8
in in the post-Taiping period.
Interestingly, the relation between a provincial graduate’s age at passing the
provincial exam and his provincial ranking also changed in after Taiping Re-
bellion. Compared to the pre-Taiping period (1804-1852), provincial graduates
who passed at younger ages were more likely to obtain higher provincial rank-
ing in the post-Taiping period (1864-1903). Table B.1 presents the relative
changes in provincial ranking quartile distribution for different groups defined
1The four missing provincial exams that are not included in the sample are in 1818,
1819, 1837 and 1888.
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Figure B.1: Ages of Passing Provincial Exam over Time
by their age quartiles.2
Table B.1: Relative Changes in Provincial Ranking Quartile Distribution for
Different Age Quartiles after Taiping Rebellion
Age Quartiles
Relative Change after Taiping Rebellion
in Each Provincial Ranking Quartiles
Q1 (Lowest) Q2 Q3 Q4 (Highest)
Q1 (Youngest) -3.30% -13.50% -3.60% 24.10%
Q2 -10.30% 2.20% -0.01% 9.20%
Q3 -0.10% 0.10% 9.00% -7.90%
Q4 (Oldest) 14.00% 19.00% -4.80% -22.10%
As shown in the first row, for an individual in the youngest age quartile,
his chance of obtaining higher provincial exam ranking increased in the post-
Taiping period. Specifically, the chance that his ranking was in the top 25%
(i.e., Q4, the highest ranking quartile) increased by 24.1%, while the chance
that he ranked in other three ranking quartiles decreased. For an individual
in the oldest age quartile, he was less likely to obtain higher ranking after
2Provincial ranking quartiles and age quartiles are computed separately for each cohort,
who passed the provincial exam at the same year.
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the Taiping Rebellion. Specifically, the chance that he ranked in the highest
quartile decreased by 22.1%, while his chances of obtaining lower rankings
increased. Results in the two age quartiles in the middle (Q2 and Q3) are
generally consistent with the pattern.
To formally evaluate the statistical significance of this pattern, I first calcu-
late the correlation coefficients between age percentile and provincial ranking
percentile for each period, and then test the difference between these two cor-
relation coefficients. The correlation coefficient for the pre-Taiping sample
is r1 = 0.049 (p = 0.013, N = 2570), and that for the post-Taiping sam-
ple is r1 = −0.051 (p = 0.005, N = 3012)3. Applying the Fisher’s z-test
(Fisher, 1925) the null hypothesis H0 : r1 = r2 (with alternative hypothesis
H1 : r1 > r2) is rejected with p < 0.0001. Using Zou’s (2007) method, the 95%
confidence interval for r1− r2 is [0.0469, 0.1519]. While the age at passing and
provincial ranking were correlated only weakly in both periods, the correla-
tion coefficients switched signs after the Taiping Rebellion, and the difference
between the two are statistically significant.
3The fact that the correlation between age at passing and provincial exam ranking was
not strong is not surprising. Most candidates started to participate in relatively young age
(after they passed prefectural-level exams or purchased the prefectural-level degree) and
then participate in the exam repeatedly until they succeeded or dropped out.
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Figure B.2: Cumulative Pass Rate in National Exams by Provincial
Graduates Cohorts
Figure B.3: Composition of Provincial Graduates’ Prefectural-level Degrees
over Time
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Figure B.4: Composition of Provincial Graduates’ Prefectural-level Degrees
over Time (Detailed)
Figure B.5: Illustration of Matching Different Sources
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Figure B.6: Matching Datasets of National Graduates and Provincial
Graduates
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Table B.2: Career Attainment and Ancestors’ Highest Degree and Office
Holding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Office rank Office rank Office rank 7A or above 5B or above
OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Age -0.0663*** -0.0623*** -0.0626*** -0.0510*** -0.0672***
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0154)
Prov. ranking pctl. 0.933*** 0.799** 0.832** 0.438 1.113***
(0.344) (0.342) (0.342) (0.299) (0.401)
Pass_nat 5.378*** 5.293*** 5.331*** 3.968*** 2.439***
(0.250) (0.248) (0.249) (0.281) (0.236)
Ancestors’ Highest Degree Status:
Purchased 0.837*** 0.574* 0.488 0.803*
(0.322) (0.326) (0.301) (0.423)
Prefectural 0.467 0.207 0.387 0.327
(0.298) (0.304) (0.289) (0.410)
Prov./Nat. 0.826** -0.205 -0.105 0.283
(0.351) (0.413) (0.381) (0.500)
Ancestors’ Highest Office Holding:
Low (below 7B) 0.430 0.485* 0.280 0.378
(0.273) (0.281) (0.238) (0.337)
Medium (7A to 4A) 1.062*** 1.223*** 0.637*** 0.862***
(0.246) (0.288) (0.238) (0.301)
High (above 3B) 1.734*** 2.135*** 1.718*** 0.754
(0.637) (0.692) (0.557) (0.648)
Sub-region:
Jiangsu -0.125 -0.146 -0.156 -0.193 -0.424*
(0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.174) (0.225)
Constant 1.348** 1.309** 1.117** -3.581*** -3.248***
(0.568) (0.549) (0.564) (0.631) (0.796)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.405 0.413 0.415 0.366 0.293
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed).
Larger ranking percentile corresponds to better ranking: 0 is the lowest ranked in the cohort, and 1 is the highest ranked.
Base cases for dummy variables: The base case for father’s office holding dummy is “None". The base case for prefectural-level
degree dummy is “Licentiate”. The base case for sub-region dummy is “Anhui”.
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B.2 The Sample Selection Issues of Examination Essays Collection
Used by Jiang and Kung (2015)
Jiang and Kung (2015) constructed their sample of provincial graduates from
Gu (1992). Given that for the provincial exams covered in my sample, I have
the complete lists of successful candidates, my sample is ideal for examining the
sample selection issues of the examination essays collection. From Gu (1992), I
collected the lists of successful candidates in Jiangnan provincial exams whose
essays are included, in the years covered by my sample.4
Table B.3 presents the percentage of Jiangnan provincial graduates in my sam-
ple whose exam papers are included in Gu (1992). The average percentage of
coverage is about 19%. The percentage is particularly high for the Jiang-
nan provincial exam in 1870, in which the exam essays of 63% of provincial
graduates were included in the collection.
Table B.3: Successful Candidates in Jiangnan Provincial Exams Whose
Essays Are Included in Gu (1992)
Year Total number ofprovincial graduates
Number of
provincial graduates
with essays included
Percentage
covered
1810 114 5 4%
1816 117 2 2%
1821 147 11 7%
1828 117 9 8%
1832 117 6 5%
1834 117 10 9%
1835 117 21 18%
1840 117 15 13%
1843 117 15 13%
1844 114 9 8%
1849 114 19 17%
1859 202 41 20%
1864 273 40 15%
1870 305 191 63%
Total 2,088 394 19%
4This task can be done accurately, using the menu of Gu (1992), which lists the name
of provincial graduates by exam year and by province.
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To examine the sample selection issues of the exam essays collection, I define
a dummy variable, included, which equals to 1 if the provincial graduate’s
provincial exam essays are included. I use logistic regression to analyze whose
exam essays were more likely to be preserved in Gu (1992). Table B.4 presents
the results. Column (1) uses the sample of provincial graduates in the 9 alumni
directories that were compiled more than 20 years after the provincial exam.
Column (2) uses the sample of provincial exam in 1870, in which the percentage
of coverage is the highest (63%).
Table B.4: Whose Exam Essays Were More Likely To Be Preserved
(1) (2)
Logit Logit
Included Included
(Full sample) (Year 1870)
Office rank 0.0409** 0.0909***
(0.0206) (0.0331)
Prov. ranking pctl. -0.334 -0.206
(0.284) (0.430)
Age pctl. 0.340 0.276
(0.291) (0.435)
Sub-region:
Jiangsu 0.195 -0.706***
(0.167) (0.260)
Constant -3.256*** 0.483
(0.515) (0.408)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 1255 302
Pseudo R2 0.271 0.037
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
(two-tailed).
The results suggest that provincial graduates’ official career attainment sig-
nificantly predicts whether their provincial exam essays were preserved in the
collection of Gu (1992). In fact, this represents for a sizable effect of sample
selection on provincial graduates’ career attainment. In 1870 (Column 2), the
predicted probability for the exam essays of a provincial graduate who held
no office to be included in the collection is 52.1%, while that for a county
magistrate is 67.2% and that for a prefect is 76.4%. For the full sample (Col-
umn 1), the predicted probability of having provincial exam essays preserved
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in the collection for those who held no office is 13.7%, while that for a county
magistrate is 17.4% and that for a prefect is 20.5%.
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